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This study attempts to discover the best predictors of mathematics and lan-
guage learning outcomes across Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tan-
zania by analysing World Bank SDI data and using machine learning methods
for variable selection purposes. Firstly, I use the SDI data to show the current
fragilities in the quality of education service delivery, while also highlighting
deficiencies in student learning outcomes. Then, I use CV Lasso, Adaptive
Lasso, and Elastic Net regularisation methods to help discover the best predic-
tors of learning outcomes. While the results from the regularisation methods
show that private schools, teacher subject knowledge, and teacher pedagogical
skills are good predictors of learning outcomes in a sample combining obser-
vations from Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania, the results
fail to infer causality by not distinguishing if unobservable factors are driving
the results. To quantify the relationship of key predictors, and for statistical
significance testing purposes, I then conduct subsequent OLS analysis. Despite
not expecting the true partial derivative effects to be identical to the OLS co-
efficients presented in this study, this study highlights deficiencies in education
service delivery and applies methods which help select key predictors of learning
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1 Introduction
Education has traditionally been, and remains, a prevalent area for economic
research. Jacob Mincer (1958, 1974) pioneered research on the effect of school-
ing on future earnings. Additionally, neoclassical growth models build on Solow
growth theory (1970) and often highlight human capital as a key factor in out-
put growth. Also, the positive spillover effects from education are becoming
increasingly recognised, highlighted by studying the effect of increased educa-
tional attainment on fertility (Kravdal, 2002), child health (Desai and Alva,
1998), crime (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) and political inclusion (Sondheimer
and Green, 2010). Therefore, education provision is widely considered as a
fundamental block in public policy and paramount for economic development.
Many economic models proxy ‘years schooling’ for ‘education’, but is it näıve
to assume that schooling is directly synonymous with learning? School enrol-
ment statistics have universally increased over the last couple of decades in
low-income countries but many children in low-income countries who complete
their primary school education still lack basic reading, writing and arithmetic
skills. For example, Pritchett and Sandefur (2020) report that only 11% of girls
in a sample of grade 4 primary school students in Nigeria could read.
Uniquely, the amount of extremely poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
is rising, from 278,000,000 in 1990 to 413,000,000 in 2015 (World Bank). In
2015, SSA was home to 27 of the world’s 28 poorest countries and had more
extremely poor people than the rest of the world combined (World Bank). Also
in 2015, the United Nations reviewed their initial 8 international development
goals and agreed on 17 revised global development goals, whereby a preliminary
goal of universal primary education was extended into a goal of quality universal
primary education. Therefore, when considering schooling, particularly in low-
income countries, we should not only be concerned about the accessibility of
schooling, but also the quality of it.
With scarce resources and comparatively tighter credit constraints, discov-
ering the best predictors of learning outcomes in SSA could prove extremely
significant when aiming to improve the quality of education service delivery by
optimising the allocation of resources. While learning outcomes in SSA remain
at low levels, compared to developed countries, it seems plausible that the global
dissonance between the rich and poor will remain.
The purpose of this thesis is to discover the best predictors of learning
outcomes in SSA1 by analysing the Service Delivery Indicators (SDI) data2,
launched by the World Bank in partnership with the African Economic Re-
search Consortium (AERC).
Firstly, I use the SDI data to show the current fragilities in the quality of ed-
ucation service delivery, while also highlighting deficiencies in student learning
outcomes. Then, I use CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net regularisation
1When I reference SSA in the context of my personal analysis, I am referring to Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania as the sample.
2Because to my knowledge, this is the first data set that attempts to measure the quality
of education service delivery, in such detail, across primary schools in SSA.
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methods to help discover the best predictors of learning outcomes. While the re-
sults from the regularisation methods show that private schools, teacher subject
knowledge, and teacher pedagogical skills are good predictors of learning out-
comes in a sample combining observations from Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Uganda, and Tanzania, the results fail to infer causality by not distinguishing
if unobservable factors are driving the results. To quantify the relationship of
key predictors, and for statistical significance testing purposes, I then conduct
subsequent OLS analysis. Despite not expecting the true partial derivative ef-
fects to be identical to the OLS coefficients presented in this study, this study
highlights deficiencies in education service delivery and applies methods which
help select key predictors of learning outcomes across the sampled schools in
the SDI data.
2 Institutional Backgrounds
In this section I briefly introduce the primary education sector across the sam-
pled countries to help contextualise the findings in this thesis.
Notably, the sampled countries have all experienced prior colonial ruling
which has inevitably shaped the current state of institutions and influenced offi-
cial national languages. In Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Tanzania3, the official
language is English, whereas in Mozambique the official language is Portuguese.
All sampled countries gained political independence in the 20th century and
range from Eastern sub-Saharan Africa4 to Western sub-Saharan Africa5.
The following net enrolment6, gross enrolment7, and net completion8 statis-
tics are from the World Bank9.
Kenya is split into 8 administrative provinces10 and within each province,
there are administrative districts which are split further into educational di-
visions. The government recognises 42 tribes and each has their own local
dialect. Notably, in 2003, the government implemented a free primary educa-
tion program, and later in 2008, public secondary schools were also made freely
available. As a result, attendance statistics increased by almost 40% within
four years, from 5,900,000 in 2003 to 8,200,000 in 200711. In 2016, the gross
3Kiswahili is also an official language in Tanzania.
4Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda.
5Nigeria.
6The total number of appropriately aged children for the given level of education that are
enrolled, expressed as a percentage of the total population in the same given age group.
7The total number of enrolled students, irrespective of age, expressed as a percentage of
the official school age population for the given level of education.
8The total number of appropriately aged children for the given level of education that
completed school, expressed as a percentage of the total population in the same given age
group.
9World Bank Metadata, UNESCO Institute for Statistics can be downloaded here: https:
//api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/SE.PRM.CMPT.MA.ZS?downloadformat=excel. Also,
the corresponding statistics used in this study represent the most recent openly available
data from the World Bank at the time of writing.
10Central, Coast, Eastern, Nairobi, North Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western.
11https://wenr.wes.org/2015/06/education-kenya.
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enrolment rate into primary education was 103.2%12, in 2019 the net enrolment
rate into primary schools was 80%, and in 2019 the net primary school com-
pletion rate was 99.7%. Typically in Kenya, schooling begins for children at
6 years old and basic primary school education is split into lower, middle and
upper primary. Grades 1 to 3 are in lower primary, grades 4 and 5 are in middle
primary, and grades 6 to 8 are in upper primary. At the end of basic primary
school, students are required to take the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education
examination (KCPE) which is supervised by the Kenya National Examination
Council (KNEC) and led by the Ministry of Education. Then, students are
ranked and streamed into secondary and technical schools dependent on their
exam results. Unlike primary schools, secondary schooling is not compulsory in
Kenya.
Mozambique is divided into 11 administrative provinces13. The provinces
are divided further into districts, and districts are divided further into mu-
nicipalities. Despite the official language being declared as Portuguese, native
languages such as Makuha, Sena and Kiswahili are also commonly used. In
1983 The National System of Education (SNE) was introduced to provide an
official public provision of education. Primary education is free and compul-
sory in Mozambique and is split into lower primary and upper primary. Lower
primary consists of grades 1 to 5, and upper primary includes grades 6 and
7. Typically, students start primary school at 6 years old and after 7 years of
primary school, students can choose to enrol into secondary education or other
alternatives. In 2019, Mozambique had a 116.4% gross primary school enrol-
ment rate and a 93.9% net enrolment rate in 2018. Also in 2019, Mozambique
had a net primary school completion rate of 54.7%.
Nigeria operates with a federal government across 36 states and the Federal
Capital Territory of Abuja. States are then divided further into local govern-
ments. The education system is directed by the Federal Ministry of Education.
Despite this, local authorities14 have the responsibility for the implementation
of public policy regarding the provision of public education. The education
system progresses from kindergarten, through to primary school and secondary
school education, and then further to tertiary education institutions. Nigeria’s
national policy on education promotes children learning in their indigenous lan-
guage for the first 3 years of schooling. Primary school education is officially free
and compulsory. Typically primary schooling begins when students are 5 years
old and then students are awarded with a Primary School Leaving Certificate
(PSLC) on completion of grade 6 which is based from a continuous assessment
approach. Progression to junior secondary education is automatic and compul-
sory. In 2016, Nigeria had an 84.6% gross primary school enrolment rate and
a 64.1% net enrolment rate in 2010. Also in 2010, Nigeria had a net primary
school completion rate of 73.8%
12The gross enrolment rate can be over 100% because of the inclusion of over-aged and
under-aged students due to early/late entrants, and grade repetition.
13Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Tete, Zambezia, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Inhambane,
Maputo City, and Maputo.
14There are 774 local authorities in Nigeria.
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Uganda is divided into 4 administrative regions and within those regions
there are 135 districts, alongside the capital city of Kampala. Districts are
then divided further into counties, sub counties, and municipalities. Since the
introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1997 primary school
education has been free15. Children are typically 6 years old when they start
primary school, and spend 7 years in primary school education, from grade 1
to grade 7. The National Curriculum Development Center (NCDC) designs the
national curriculum for use at all UPE public primary schools. The curricu-
lum for the 7 years of Ugandan elementary education is divided into 3 cycles:
lower primary (grade 1 to grade 3), transition (grade 4), and upper primary
(grade 5 to grade 7). In lower primary, classes are taught in the local language,
if possible, and then English is typically introduced as the primary language
of instruction in grade 4. Before leaving primary school, students must take
the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) to be awarded with their Primary
School Leaving Certificate administered by the Uganda National Examination
Board (UNEB). This exam is a requirement for students aiming to continue
into secondary schools and vocational programs. Despite Uganda becoming the
first sub-Saharan African country to introduce a Universal Secondary Education
(USE) program, students must score high enough in their PLE in order to attain
the government-funded enrolment status. In 2017, Uganda had an 102.7% gross
primary school enrolment rate and a 95.5% net enrolment rate in 2013. Also in
2017, Uganda had a net primary school completion rate of 52.7%.
Tanzania is divided into 31 regions which are subdivided into districts, dis-
tricts are then further subdivided into local wards. Within Tanzania there are
believed to be around 120 different tribes with varying languages and dialects.
Since 2001, the public provision of primary school education has been free for
students and attending primary school is compulsory. Teaching in public schools
is usually instructed in Kiswahili, whereas private schools tend to instruct in
English. Before entering primary school, some students spend the first 2 years of
their schooling career in a pre-primary educational institution. Primary school
should last for 7 years and students should legally begin primary school at the
age of 7. At the end of grade 7, students take the Primary School Leaving
Examination (PSLE), which acts as selection examinations for entry into sec-
ondary school. Irrespective of their test result, all students will also receive a
Primary School Leaving Certificate.
15For initially up to 4 children per family before the policy was revised to further improve
enrolment and educational attain for families with more than 4 children.
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3 Education Production Function Theory
In this section basic education production theory is presented to provide clarity
on the different relationships that researchers can estimate when attempting to
discover the best predictors of learning outcomes. This section also provides
a framework to follow when reviewing the literature, and conducting analysis,
aiding the process of discovering the best predictors of learning outcomes by
classifying effects.
Glewwe and Muralidharan (2016) explain a standard theoretical framework
for understanding how various inputs at the household, school and classroom
level translate into learning outcomes.
A = a(S,Q,C,H, I) (1)
S = f(Q,C,H, P ) (2)
I = g(Q,C,H, P ) (3)
A = h(Q,C,H, P ) (4)
Equation (1) represents the education production function, whereA = achieve-
ment (learning outcomes), S = years of schooling, Q = a vector of schooling
quality, C = a vector of child characteristics, H = a vector of household char-
acteristics and I = a vector of school inputs that households control (like atten-
dance, effort, homework). In equations (2), (3), and (4), P is price.
Equations (2) and (3) represent the household decision making process on
both school attendance and the extent of investments in education, based on
optimising household utility, subject to the education production function and a
set of constraints. Assume that C and H are exogenous to households, and that
S and I are endogenous and dependent on another important set of variables,
like P . In a simple scenario, we could assume that there is only one school
option and parents cannot change the characteristics of such school, making Q
and P exogenous. Parents then choose S and I to maximise household utility.
Inserting equations (2) and (3) into (1) creates (4). Equation (4) highlights
a reduced form equation which expresses a causal relationship but is not a
production function because it reflects household preferences and includes P .
Policy makers should be concerned with the impact of education policies
on academic achievement A. Equation (1) is significant because it shows how
Q affects A ceteris paribus, and therefore provides the partial derivative of A
with respect to Q. Whereas equation (4) provides the total derivative of A with
respect to Q as it allows for changes in S and I in response to the change in
Q. This represents a policy parameter as parents may respond to better school
quality by increasing their provision of education inputs if seen as a complement,
or could reduce their provision of educational inputs if considered as a substitute.
So, the partial and total derivative effects could be quite different in reality and
researchers should be clear which relationship they are estimating. Knowing
both the nominal production function impact of a policy change and its total
real policy impact may also capture overall welfare effects.
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Glewwe and Muralidharan highlighted two main challenges when attempting
to estimate the relationship in either equation (1) or equation (4). First is that
these equations represent the relationship between inputs and the total stock
of human capital, therefore, to accurately estimate the production function in
equation (1), the researcher should have data on all prior inputs of human capital
which is extremely challenging and perhaps unfeasible. So, a standard approach
when estimating the education production functions is to treat the lagged test
score as a sufficient statistic to represent prior inputs into learning, and to use
a value-added model to study the impact of changing contemporaneous inputs
into education on test scores. Todd and Wolpin (2003) expand on this model
and the assumptions needed for this approach to yield consistent estimates of
production function parameters of interest.
Ai,t = γAi,t−1 + βXi,t + εi,t (5)
In equation (5), A is again the child’s test score, but present and lagged.
X represents a full vector of contemporaneous home and school inputs. While
the production function above is linear in terms of X, the specification does
not have to be as restrictive because X can include quadratic terms in indi-
vidual inputs and also include interaction terms between specific sets of inputs.
However, even with the value-added equation (5), the second challenge to con-
sistently estimate β is that the variation in the independent variables are likely
to be correlated with the error term. Essentially, variations in observed school,
teacher and household characteristics are all likely to be correlated with unob-
served/omitted school, teacher and household variables that directly determine
learning outcomes, leading to biased estimates of β16.
4 Literature Review
In this section I review causal literature that explores improving learning out-
comes in lesser-developed countries. Notably, the literature examining learning
outcomes in the developing world is growing and this is represented by multiple
extended literature reviews ((Banerjee et al., 2013), (Kremer et al., 2013),(Kr-
ishnaratne et al., 2013), (McEwan, 2015), (Murnane and Ganimian, 2014), and
(Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016)).
While regression analysis is commonly used to analyse the impact of policy
interventions on learning outcomes, a key problem is endogeneity. Often, true
underlying factors driving learning outcomes are rarely captured in regressions
which leads to omitted variable bias in the estimates of the effect of education
policies on learning outcomes, and thus extends to misleading results. Like
16For example, communities and parents that care more about education may be more
likely to successfully influence school inputs, and also more likely to provide unmeasured
inputs into their child’s education, which would lead to an upward bias on β when equation
(5) is estimated using cross-sectional data. In other cases, governments may target inputs to
disadvantaged areas, in which case areas with higher values of X may have lower values of ε,
leading to a negative correlation between X and ε, and thus a downward bias estimate of β.
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Glewwe et al. (2004) found in the context of estimating the effect of flipcharts on
learning outcomes in Kenya, regression estimates predicted a rise in test scores
of 0.2 standard deviations, whereas an Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT)
follow up study found no impact on test scores. Now, this is not to say that
regression coefficients are useless, but in this literature review, I will try to focus
on analysis which follows quality causal frameworks. High quality descriptive
work is also insightful because the findings can highlight key relationships which
then present areas for conducting follow-up causal experimental designs. The
literature review in this thesis suggests that there are multiple avenues in which
the efficiency of education spending in developing countries can be improved
by reallocating public expenditure from less cost-effective to more cost-effective
solutions. But clearly, making the optimal decisions for learning outcomes is
complicated and varies contextually.
4.1 Schooling Time
Schools, and the time that students are in schools, represents initial determi-
nants of learning outcomes. Burde and Linden (2013) used an RCT to ex-
plore the impact of opening primary schools on children’s enrolments rates and
learning outcomes in rural areas of Afghanistan where schools were scarce geo-
graphically. The study was conducted in the Ghor province, where only 29% of
families lived within 5km of a primary school in 2007 and they found that the
program increased enrolment rates by 51.5 percentage-points for girls and 34.6
percentage-points for boys. Also, after 6 months, average test scores increased
by 0.66 standard deviations for girls and 0.41 standard deviations for boys, and
notably, both results were statistically significant and included children who
were not enrolled in school. The heterogeneous enrollment effects between boys
and girls could be reflected by the initial disparity between boy and girl en-
rolments rates, which could be affected by girls not being allowed to travel to
neighboring villages to attend schools.
Using a regression-discontinuity-design (RDD) Kazianga et al. (2013) esti-
mated the causal effects of constructing “girl-friendly” primary schools in rural
Burkina Faso on enrolment rates and learning outcomes. These schools were
attributed with higher qualities amenities for girls, compared to general schools
prior to the intervention. Overall, the schools increased enrolment rates for boys
and girls by 20 percentage-points, whereby the effect for girls was 5 percentage-
points higher than boys. They also found that test scores increased by 0.41
standard deviations in villages that previously had no primary school17.
These two studies suggest that building schools in areas with low school avail-
ability can lead to large increases in school enrolment and subsequent learning
outcomes.
Building on school construction, instruction time is another factor affect-
ing student’s learning outcomes. Bellei (2009) used a differences-in-differences
17This result was an average between French and Mathematics exams for both boys and
girls.
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(DiD) estimation framework and found a significant positive estimation on the
effect of increasing the length of the school day on learning outcomes in Chile.
Similarly, Orkin (2013) found a similar relationship using the same empirical
strategy in Ethiopia, but many of the results on learning outcomes were insignif-
icant. Assuming that student absenteeism does not increase, it seems plausible
that increasing the instruction time will increase learning outcomes, if instruc-
tion times are not already set at excessive levels.
4.2 Teachers
Teachers are one of the key stakeholders in schools and represent a focused area
in research when studying the optimisation of learning outcomes.
Exploring teacher absence rates, Chaudhury et al. (2006) present findings
from a multi-country study where unannounced visits were made to public
schools in order to measure teacher attendance and general activity. Across
Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Uganda, they report average
absence rates amongst teachers of 19%. Kremer et al. (2005) report findings
which support the idea that teacher absenteeism may be a problem in the de-
veloping world. They report that, on average, 25% of teachers in their sample
of India were absent, and that another 25% of teachers were in school but not
teaching. Therefore, they conclude that around half of the teachers were found
to be engaged in teaching. Muralidharan et al. (2016) present results from
a nationally representative panel survey which revisited the rural villages sur-
veyed by Kremer et al. (2005), and found a small reduction in teacher absence
rates, to 23.7%. They then calculated the fiscal cost of teacher absence in India
which totalled $1.5billion, highlighting the economic cost of low teacher effort
and potentially poor governance. Building on absence rates in India, Duflo et
al. (2012) found that teacher absence rates were above 40% in schools run
by an NGO in Rajasthan. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) studied
teacher absence with multiple unexpected visits to a representative sample of
rural public primary schools in Andhra Pradesh. They discovered high civil
service teacher absenteeism, estimated at 27%, whereas contract teachers were
less likely to be absent from school with their absenteeism estimated at 18%.
Also, their experimental evidence suggests that students in schools assigned an
extra contract teacher scored higher in mathematics and language tests. De-
spite contract teachers earning roughly 1/5th of a civil service teacher’s wage
and typically attributed with less formal education, the results suggest that they
are no less effective at raising pupil learning outcomes.
Contract teachers comprise around a third of public-school teachers across
twelve countries in Africa (Bourdon et al. (2007)), therefore it seems relevant
to review some of the literature which causally links this shift to learning out-
comes, as contracts with periodic renewals could increase teachers’ effort levels.
Opposing this, some argue that using under-qualified and under-trained con-
tract teachers may increase teacher presence but will not translate into learning
outcomes, and that the use of contract teachers can reduce the professionalism
of teaching as a practice, reducing the motivation of all teachers (Govmda and
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Josephine (2005)).
Duflo et al. (2015) conducted an experimental evaluation of a program in
Kenya which randomly allocated an extra contract teacher to selected schools,
which on average reduced first grade class sizes from around 80 to 40. Half of the
students were then randomly assigned to the contract teachers, and the other
half to the existing civil service teacher. The results show that reducing class
sizes in regards to the civil service teaching had no effect on test scores, whereas
the students who experienced reduced class sizes but were then taught by the
contract teacher scored significantly higher in test results of around 0.29 stan-
dard deviations. They found that, even when controlling class sizes, students
taught by contract teachers scored significantly higher than those taught by civil
service teachers, despite the contract teachers remuneration being substantially
lower.
These results suggest that contract teachers may make up for their lack of
conventional teaching training and education through increased effort. This
is significant for policymakers aiming to increase learning outcomes given tight
public budget constraints. But the management and administration of such pro-
grammes could be pivotal, as Duflo et al. (2015) found that when the contract
teacher program was implemented by the government, the effect on learning
outcomes was non-existent, compared to positive effects when implemented by
a non-profit partner.
Therefore, the pay structure of teachers could be an interesting factor which
could increase learning outcomes. Salary structures which motivate teachers to
put in more effort should translate into increased learning outcomes for stu-
dents if implemented correctly. However, there’s a debate on how to measure
teacher performance fairly and further concerns that link pay to performance
on measureable outcomes which may lead to a diversion of effort way from other
valuable tasks which measureable outcomes fail to capture (Baker (1992); Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1991)). Despite this, low levels of teacher attendance, per-
ceived as effort, in developing countries have led policymakers and researchers
to analyse the possibilities of introducing performance pay linked contracts for
teachers to boost learning outcomes.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) conducted a RCT in India to mea-
sure the impact of teacher related bonus payments based off student test scores,
and the subsequent effect on learning outcomes. They found that after two
years, students in the incentive schools performed significantly better than stu-
dents in control schools by 0.27 standard deviations in mathematics and 0.17
standard deviations in language tests. Treated students also performed better in
subjects where teachers’ bonuses were unrelated, suggesting positive spill over
effects. The treatment group was split between individual incentivised teachers
and collective incentivised teachers, the research found no significant difference
on learning outcomes. This incentive based intervention was implemented at the
same time as other experimental evaluations with equal cost and this allowed the
researchers to conclude that the teacher incentive program effects on learning
outcomes were greater than other greater than the effects from other additional
schooling inputs of the same value. Muralidharan (2012) presents further ev-
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idence after a long-term follow-up in the same context after the program was
extended for 5 years and found that individual teacher incentive programmes
effects on learning outcomes were larger, and in general, more significant than
group incentive programmes. This study suggests that incentive programmes
can be up to 20 times more cost effective than default policy which aims at
reducing pupil-teacher ratios when analysing the effect on learning outcomes.
Glewwe et al. (2010) conducted a natural experiment in Kenya to analyse
the effects of school level group incentives for high test scores. The prizes were
distributed via tournament design and the authors conclude that the incentive
programme led to teachers increasing effort for test-preparation but not in activ-
ities that could lead to increases in long term learning. Factors such as absence
rates were not improved. They found that treated students performed better
on high stake tests but not low stake tests, and that the gains evaporated after
the incentive programme finished. They interpret these results by highlighting
that teacher incentives may not be an effective strategy to increase long term
learning outcomes. But importantly, it is clear that many interventions seem to
have high levels of test score decay (Andrabi et al. (2011)), and that grouped in-
centive programmes can foster environments inducing free riding (Muralidharan
(2012)).
Contreras and Rau (2012) used a DiD approach to evaluate a programme
which provided teacher bonus payments in Chile based on student’s test scores.
Their estimates indicate that the programme led to significant increases of 0.29
standard deviations on mathematics scores. Incentives could be based off at-
tendance rather than student’s test scores which might be easier to monitor
and manage yet provide positive results on learning outcomes. Like Duflo et
al. (2012) found, paying teachers based on their attendance reduced teacher
absence rates by 21% while significant increases in student test scores also oc-
curred. Alternatively, De Ree et al. (2018) found that an unconditional increase
in teacher salaries led to no significant improvements in student learning out-
comes after a couple of years in Indonesia. The literature suggests that it is
extremely important to design bonus schemes well and ensure that designs re-
flect insights from economic theory, so that modest changes to compensation
schemes and generate substantial improvements in learning outcomes.
4.3 Class Sizes and Sorting
Education systems globally unanimously agree that student-teacher ratios are
an important driver of education quality which influence learning outcomes.
This is evident from many policy recommendations globally which impose a
limit on how many students should be in each classroom, based on student-
teacher ratios. Essentially, if a teacher has a larger class, they will be able to
give less individual attention to students compared to the identical teacher with
a smaller class and the same instruction time.
Urquiola (2001) used a RDD method and estimated that lower student-
teacher ratios in Bolivia resulted in significantly higher language scores for stu-
dents, but reported no highly significant effects on mathematics scores. Uro-
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quiola and Verhoogen (2009) also used a RDD method to estimate the impact
of class sizes on test scores, but this time in Chile. The authors reinforce the
findings that smaller class sizes can have significantly positive effects on learn-
ing outcomes. In their study, there was a positive effect on languages and also
mathematics18.
Duflo et al. (2015) explored the effect of reducing class sizes on learning
outcomes through analysing the impact of programme which randomly assigned
contract teachers to school in Kenya. Despite a reduction in class size from 82 to
44 on average, students assigned to stay in existing classes taught by civil service
teachers experienced no significant increases in test scores. However, test results
increased for the students that were assigned to locally hired contact teachers.
The authors believe that absence rates and effort may have varied between the
civil service teachers and the locally hired contract teachers, with the later being
further incentivised by their contractual structure. Hence, they precautiously
conclude on the effect of reduced class sizes on learning outcomes.
While the evidence from developing countries is relatively small, assum-
ing that student-teacher ratios affect learning outcomes seems highly plausible.
However, further credible evidence on these effects in developing countries is
needed as the cost of increasing the supply of teachers to reduce class sizes can
be very expensive. Further analysis is needed to see if the cost of providing
more teachers produces significant returns on learning outcomes, compared to
cheaper interventions.
Another way to change the student experience in classrooms is by sorting,
or streaming, because public and private schools often sort classrooms based on
ability. Interestingly, Duflo et al. (2011) conducted an experimental evaluation
which tracked and streamed pupils into relevant ability sorted classes in Kenya.
They found highly significant positive effects on test scores in both the short
and the long term, and these effects persisted after 1 year. But it raises the
question if the top percentile of students’ gains were disproportionately higher
than the lower percentage of students (students sorted by test results before
the intervention). This type of programme may raise average test scores, but it
could increase inequality amongst learning outcomes.
4.4 Physical Schooling Inputs
The supply of school facilities, or physical schooling inputs, can also dictate
the quality of schooling and analysing the effects of the provision of physical
schooling inputs on learning outcomes seem to be well covered in the literature.
A positive relationship between school facilities is expected as inputs such as
books, pens, paper are considered complementary in the learning process.
Glewwe et al. (2009) conducted an RCT to study the effect of textbook pro-
vision on learning outcomes in Kenya. Surprisingly, they found no statistically
significant effects. Subsequently, the authors explored the reasons behind these
18However around half of the sampled schools in Uroquilo and Verhoogen’s study were
private schools.
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findings and they discovered that the textbooks, provided by the government,
were too difficult for the average child to read in districts of Busia and Teso in
Kenya. When the sample was restricted to the top 20% of students, and the
top 40% in some samples, the textbooks did indeed improve student’s learning
outcomes.
In Sierra Leone, Sabarwal et al. (2014) also conducted an RCT to mea-
sure the impact of textbook provision on learning outcomes and they found no
positive effects. However, their surprising results may have hinged on the fact
that the schools failed to distribute the textbooks to the students. The pro-
gramme was initiated by the Ministry of Education without encouraging the
schools to distribute the textbooks to students. Resultantly, most textbooks
were stored in the school and Sabarwal et al. provided some evidence which
suggested that negative expectations of future resources from staff led to this
failure in distribution.
Overall, it seems that textbooks, that are actually provided to students, can
have positive impacts on learning outcomes if they are of the appropriate level
to the students. If textbook complexity is misaligned with student knowledge
levels, they can have minimal or zero effects on learning outcomes.
Borkum et al. (2012) used an RCT to study the effect of libraries on at-
tendance and also learning outcomes. They study the effect of in-school and
traveling library provisions in India. They found that in-school libraries had no
effect on language scores and that travelling libraries had a negative effect of
0.22 standard deviations on language scores.
Also as previously mentioned, Glewwe et al. (2004) found no impact of flip
charts on learning outcomes after following an RCT experimental design after
the initial regression results pointed towards a positive relationship.
Tan et al. (1999) estimate the impact of providing three types of ’multi-
level learning materials’ alongside ’parent-teacher partnerships’ by conducting
an RCT in the Philippines. They found that two out of the three multilevel
materials positively and significantly impacted test scores across language and
mathematics. They also found that all three multilevel materials combined
with parent-teacher partnerships had significantly positive results on learning
outcomes across language and mathematics test scores. However, it’s unclear to
what extent each combination of the parent-teacher partnerships and multilevel
learning materials had on learning outcomes because these differences were not
clearly distinguished.
Technological improvements have typically played a pivotal role increasing
productivity, hence some believe that technological investments in education
could be extremely positive for improving learning outcomes.
Banerjee et al. (2007) found significant positive impacts of computer aided
learning programme interventions in India. While Yang et al. (2013) and Mo et
al. (2014) found significant positive effects of the computer aided learning pro-
gramme on learning outcomes in China, but questions arose around the cost of
such programmes and how efficiently they can be implemented. Alternatively,
Barrera-Osorio and Linden (2009) conducted a RCT in Colombia and found no
impact of the provision of computers on learning outcomes. One caveat is if the
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lack of impact was because poor implementation and the inability of teachers
to optimally incorporate the technology in their teaching. Similarly, in Peru,
Beuermann et al. (2013) studied the impact of the ‘One Laptop Per Child’ pro-
gramme through a large scale RCT and found no impact on test scores across
language and mathematics. Both results suggest that the magnitude of invest-
ment in education does not always translate directly into learning outcomes.
Opposing this, Linden (2008) conducted a RCT and found negative impacts
of the Gyan Shala Computer Assisted Learning (CAL) project on learning out-
comes in India when the technology was implemented in class and acted as a
substitute for regular instruction. Linden believes implementation of the tech-
nology could explain negative impact of 0.57 standard deviations on test scores
because it was treated as an ’in-class substitution’. When the technology was
implemented as an ’out-of class complement’, test scores rose (insignificantly).
Malamund and Pop-Eleches (2011) conducted a RDD study to measure the im-
pact of distributing computer vouchers on learning outcomes for middle-school
students in Romania but their results were mixed.
These results suggest that wariness is required when policymakers opt for
expensive large scale technological interventions like providing computers for all.
From the outset, these policies seem extremely positive and ambitious. There
are many reasons to be excited about technology significantly improving learn-
ing outcomes. However, there is also evidence that questions the effectiveness
of such policies which can depend crucially on the implementation. Effective
pedagogical techniques need to also be developed at the same time of technolog-
ical roll-outs, otherwise teachers may not be equipped to optimise the potential
returns that translate in increased learning outcomes. It’s clear that more re-
search is needed here, especially when public funds are highly constrained, the
opportunity cost becomes more significant.
4.5 Student Health Related Provisions
There is substantial evidence that well-nourished, healthy children have better
learning outcomes, yet child malnutrition remains a prevalent issue not just in
SSA but across many developing countries. Providing nutrition in schools is one
way to ensure students have access to good nutrition, while also increasing the
demand for education. Glewwe and Miguel (2008) support this notion. Many
developing countries now have opted to implement programmes which allocate
meals to students and sometimes to their families too.
Kazianga et al. (2012) evaluated two programmes in Burkina Faso which
provided meals to school children from low income households by conducting
an RCT. They found that take-home rations increased mathematics scores by
0.08 standard variations, and this result was statistically significant.
Utilising a RDD method, McEwan (2013) found statistically insignificant
impacts of a school feeding program on language and mathematics test scores
amongst grade 4 children in Chile. Also, Adrogue and Orlicki (2013) executed
a DiD model and found a small and statistically insignificant impact of the pro-
vision of school meals on mathematics scores of grade 3 students in Argentina.
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However, Tan et al. (1999) found significantly positive impacts of school meal
provision on Mathematics and Filipino test scores through their DiD estimates
in the Philippines. Mathematics test scores increased by 0.25 standard devia-
tions, while Filipino scores increased by 0.16 standard deviations.
After examining the provision of food affecting students’ educational out-
comes, studying whether the provision of healthcare could also drive improved
learning outcomes seems reasonable. After all, it is widely accepted that many
individuals in developing countries are more exposed to severe health problems
than individuals living in developed countries.
Miguel and Kremer (2004) implemented an RCT in rural Kenya to estimate
the impact of providing deworming medicine to primary school students. They
discovered no effect on learning outcomes. Notably, an interesting follow-up
paper by Ozier (2018) examined the spill-over effects stemming from the Kenyan
deworming programme on younger siblings of treated children. Ozier found
significant positive effects on the test scores of children who were younger than
1 when the deworming programme was implemented and also after 10 years.
Another follow up study by Baird et al. (2016) found that after 10 years,
women who were eligible for the programme as school girls were 25% more
likely to have attended secondary school and that boys were more likely to have
completed primary school. Baird et al. also found large positive labour market
effects. Combined, these findings suggest that long term gains exist from the
deworming programme, even if the short-term gains on learning outcomes were
minimal.
In China, Luo et al. (2012) and Sylvia et al. (2013) provide some evidence
that iron supplements can increase student learning outcomes. However, the
external validity must be questioned. Also in China, Glewwe et al. (2016) con-
ducted an RCT to estimate the impact of the provision of glasses on learning
outcomes within rural Chinese primary schools. They found that the glasses
significantly raised average test scores amongst by at least 0.16 standard devi-
ations.
4.6 Finance
Increasing school’s budgets seems a relatively simple measure to improve edu-
cational outcomes as schools are able to allocate more resources into beneficial
programmes. Das et al. (2013) presented a dynamic household optimisation
model relating test scores to school and household inputs. In India, they showed
how unexpected school block grants of around $3 per student, increased test
scores by 0.09 standard deviations. However, they also showed that expected
grants either had no effect or very little, as households responded by decreas-
ing spending on education. This suggests that providing additional schooling
finance in India could be seen as a substitute, rather than a complement for
households’ education investment decisions. Olken et al. (2014) conducted a
field experiment in Indonesian villages to see if block grants improve health and
education outcomes. Specifically, they found no positive effects on student test
scores. Additionally, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) showed evidence of financial
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leakage in a school government transfer programme in Uganda, they also antic-
ipated that this phenomena is not exclusively happening in Uganda. Therefore,
policies which aim to provide financial injection to improve learning outcomes
should also be monitored to limit corruption.
4.7 Monitoring and Community Engagement
Monitoring and collective community involvement in the provision of schooling
could be a key factor when aiming to optimise learning outcomes.
Muralidharan et al. (2016) used a nationally representative village level
panel data set from India on teacher absence to examine the correlations be-
tween changes in various school and management characteristics and changes in
teacher absence. They found that increasing the probability of a school being
inspected within three months was correlated with a 7 percentage-point reduc-
tion in teacher absence. This estimate was similar in cross-sectional and panel
estimates, and also bivariate regressions, with and without district fixed effects.
The researchers predicted that monitoring could be over 10 times more cost
effective at increasing teacher led instruction time than hiring more teachers.
However, evidence on the impact of monitoring teachers time spent teaching
on learning outcomes in developing countries is small. Banerjee et al. (2010)
assessed the impact of bottom up monitoring through the community, but they
found no positive effects on teacher effort or learning outcomes.
Other bottom up monitoring polices have been analysed and one study by
Pandey et al. (2009) used an experimental evaluation of an information cam-
paign to improve parental participation in village education committees. They
found positive effects on learning outcomes, but many of the estimated im-
pacts were statistically insignificant. Pradhan et al. (2011) also conducted
an experimental evaluation of multiple interventions which aimed at increasing
community participation in school management in Indonesia. They only found
one significantly positive impact on tests scores form the “linkage” intervention,
which facilitated meetings between school committees and village councils.
Beasley and Huillery (2017) conducted a randomised experiment to explore
the effect of a parent-empowerment programme in Niger. The programme allo-
cated grants to school committees to encourage parent participation in school
management processes. However, the programme had no measured impact on
learning outcomes. The authors suggest that this may because many parents do
not have the knowledge and necessary information to make effective decisions
to optimise educational quality. Glewwe and Mäıga (2011) and Lassibille et
al. (2010) both conducted experimental evaluations of the Amélioration de la
Gestion de l’Education à Madagascar (AGEMAD) programme in Madagascar
which tried to strengthen school management practices with the community at
various levels. However, both studies also found limited measured significant
impacts on student test scores.
Similarly, Duflo et al. (2015) conducted an experimental design to explore
the impact of the School Based Management (SBM) programme in Kenya and
found that training school management committees to evaluate the performance
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of contract teachers had significantly positive impacts on the performance of
contract teachers and student test scores. This adds to an interesting branch of
research suggesting that improving teachers’ motivation could be a cost-effective
method when trying to improve test scores. Perhaps this is an interesting in-
tervention for schools with a high supply of contract teachers where monitoring
isn’t frequently and effectively occurring.
Gertler et al. (2012) conducted DiD analysis on the impact of a programme
in Mexico which empowered parents to improve school quality. They found that
the programme reduced student failure rates and grade repetition rates, but had
no impact on dropout rates. They also found that the AGE programme had
no impact in poorer communities, suggesting that community empowered gov-
ernance programmes may increase inequality across schools. Santibanez et al.
(2014) also used a DiD strategy to evaluate another school based management
project in Mexico. They found that the programme had no general effect on
student test scores.
It seems that the literature suggests that there may be problems with collec-
tive action and community involvement in school based management projects,
especially in disadvantaged areas with low levels of parental education, which
may make community monitoring less effective than top down monitoring from
government administrations.
4.8 Private Schools
Private schools now account for over 20% of total primary school enrolment
in low-income countries (Baum et al. (2014)). This raises questions of the ef-
ficiency of public schooling provision compared to private school provision on
learning outcomes, and whether policymakers should respond to their growth.
A weakness of private schools is the lack of accessibility to the poor and many
argue that policymakers should allocate support programmes enabling a larger
share of the population from lower socio-economic backgrounds to have the op-
portunity to attend private schools. (Tooley et al. (2007); Muralidharan and
Kremer (2006); Goyal and Pandey (2009)).
Angrist et al. (2002) and Angrist et al. (2006) study the randomised as-
signment of vouchers from the PACES programme in Colombia to estimate the
effect on learning outcomes from private secondary school attendance. They
found that treated students who received vouchers scored higher in mathemat-
ics and reading tests after three years and that they completed more schooling
years with a lower chance of grade repetition. The later study discovered that
treated students also had significantly higher graduation rates and scored higher
on college entrance exams, even after controls for differential attrition. However
it must be noted that the PACES programme allowed parents to supplement
vouchers with their own income and that students had to maintain certain
academic standards to continue with the programme. So the results do not dis-
tinguish the effectiveness of student incentives, additional education spending,
and private school effects on learning outcomes.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) conducted a RCT to measure the
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effect of the school choice programme in Andhra Pradesh, India, on learning
outcomes. This intervention allowed a randomisation of selection into private
schools and the researchers created a set of control villages allowing a robust
presentation of individual and aggregate returns to the treatment. They explain
that differences in the measured test outcomes19 were mainly driven by omitted
variables, but they did find that private schools spent significantly less time
on teaching mathematics and the native language Telugu, compared to public
schools. As a result, private school students spent more time on other subjects
like languages, sciences, and social studies, which were not taught in the public
schools. Assuming equal weights across all subjects, the researchers found that
the treated students who received the vouchers and were schooled privately had
higher average test scores of 0.26 standard deviations which were significantly
significant, but this was mainly driven by Hindi. Even without assuming the
equal weights across subjects, the results point to private schools being more
efficient and being able to attain equal levels of learning outcomes with less
instruction time. Also, in the sample, the annual cost of a student in a public
school is believed to be over three times the mean cost per student in private
schools.
Lucas and Mbiti (2014) support the notion that elite private schools may
not add much added value to the marginal, or less academically gifted students
in terms of learning outcomes, but that private schools tend to select the most
intellectual students which can skew the perceived effects of attending private
schools. While Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) found evidence of a private school
voucher programme in Chile resulting in ’sorting’, where the best public school
students left for private school, they found no effects on educational outcomes
from students who switched from public to private schools. The challenge em-
pirically is to compare the counterfactual outcomes of attending private school
or public school for a given individual to account for unobserved individual char-
acteristics. Addressing this challenge, Lara et al. (2011) employed propensity
score econometric techniques and a changes-in-changes estimation method and
used data which contained the previous academic achievement levels of students
in Chile, this identification strategy allowed the authors to identify differences
in students’ unobservable characteristics and they found that the effect of the
private school voucher education amounted to a small increase in test scores.
In general, it seems that private schools could be more productive at achiev-
ing learning outcomes. Much of the literature suggests that the allocation of
resources in the public sector is inefficient in comparison. More evidence is
needed from a wider range of countries to understand whether this trend ex-
tends across much of the developing world.
19Mathematics and Telugu.
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5 SDI Data and Samples
In this section, I present the SDI data20 which I use to help discover what the
best predictors of learning outcomes might be. I also show some initial descrip-
tive findings on the current state of the quality of education service delivery
and resultant learning outcomes, before finally outlining some concerns with
the data. The SDI data reports information ranging across physical schooling
inputs, teacher characteristics, school finances, classroom observations, pupil
assessments, and teacher assessments. Table 10 in A.1 highlights the data col-
lection methodology followed by the SDI team in more detail. Also please refer
to Table 11 in A.1 for more information regarding SDI data modules.
I selected the samples surveys from Kenya (2012), Nigeria (2013), Uganda
(2013), Tanzania (2014), and Mozambique (2014) for the analysis in this the-
sis due to the heightened comparability of the survey designs21 and due to the
scarce availability of this type of data in SSA. Within each country, the sam-
pled schools originate from all different states and regions22. The SDI data was
intended to provide a representative snapshot of education service delivery by
using a multistage, cluster-sampling design. Survey weights are available with
the data but I did not use these due to a lack of information available regarding
the consideration of missing observations on the design of the weights. There-
fore, the results I present represent a snapshot of the selected schools in the
sample, rather than the whole population of interest in the selected countries23.
All sampled schools vary categorically as either urban or rural, and whether
they are publicly owned or privately owned24. Because of the relatively small
sample sizes, I also analysed a sample of ’All Countries’, combining all school
observations from the sampled countries with equal weights for each school.
20To my knowledge, there is no other set of indicators that exist which measures the quality
of service delivery in SSA in the same detail as the SDI indicators.
21Pilot surveys administered in Senegal and Tanzania record slightly different data to the
samples I selected, and the data for Togo doesn’t distinguish teachers in the same level of
detail as the other selected samples.
22Apart from Nigeria, where surveys represent Anambra, Bauchi, Ekiti and Niger states.
23In Kenya 306 schools were sampled, in Tanzania 400 schools were sampled, in Uganda 400
schools were sampled, in Mozambique 203 schools were sampled, and in Nigeria 706 schools
were sampled.
24Apart from Mozambique where all sampled schools are public.
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5.1 Descriptive Findings
In this subsection, I present the descriptive findings from the SDI data to high-
light the current state of the provision of schooling across the sampled countries.
To discover the best predictors of learning outcomes, learning outcomes are
proxied by student test results. Table 1 shows a comparison of literacy/language
and mathematics student test results across the sampled countries. Staggeringly,
we can see that across the whole sample, on average, 4th grade students in
SSA could only read 43% of a selected paragraph in their chosen language
correctly. Also across the sample, we can see that, on average, 55% students
could successfully add double digits numbers. The measures selected in Panel A
and Panel B represent skills that 4th graders are expected to perform relatively
well in. Consequently, the results heighten the significance discovering the best
predictors of learning outcomes in SSA.
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Student Learning Outcomes
Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Tanzania Uganda All
Panel A: Average Student
Literacy/Language Levels
Pupil literacy test score (%) 80 22 46 50 53 50
Identifies letters (%) 97 63 83 80 87 82
Identifies words (%) 93 40 57 80 80 70
Can read a sentence (%) 91 17 52 26 58 49
Can read paragraph (%) 83 17 41 26 48 43
Total students sampled for testing 2952 1758 6735 3999 3957 19401
Panel B: Average Student
Mathematics Levels
Pupil mathematics test score (%) 60 25 40 49 46 44
Recognises numbers (%) 100 90 83 97 97 93
Can order numbers (%) 73 21 40 48 51 47
Can add single digits (%) 92 48 71 81 84 75
Can add double digits (%) 85 18 50 64 60 55
Can add triple digits (%) 88 9 41 64 60 52
Can subtract single digits (%} 89 30 65 76 79 68
Can subtract double digits (%) 65 5 31 42 31 35
Can multiply single digits (%) 52 4 33 40 27 31
Can multiply double digits (%) 10 0 8 14 2 7
Can multiply triple digits (%) 4 0 6 11 1 4
Can divide single digits (%) 63 8 29 40 41 36
Can divide double digits (%) 38 2 19 20 17 19
Can complete a sequence (%) 26 4 20 16 13 16
Total students sampled for testing 2952 1758 6735 3999 3957 19401
Table 1: Reports the average of competencies of 4th grade students sampled
across both government and private primary schools. In Kenya students were
tested in English, in Mozambique students were tested in Portuguese, in Nigeria
students were tested in English, in Tanzania students were tested in either
English or Swahili, in Togo students were tested in French, and in Uganda
students were tested in English. These results are not weighted, however, the
average of ’All’ countries is calculated by averaging all countries’ totals, whereby
each country has an equal weight.
Similar to Bold (2017), combining observational classroom data, absenteeism
data, and administrative opening times data, Table 2 compares predicted mea-
sures that students experience regarding learning times, unsupervised class-
rooms, and teacher absenteeism. Across the sample, we can see considerable
gaps between scheduled teaching times and estimated effective teaching times.
22
Effective Teaching Time
Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Tanzania Uganda All
Panel A: Daily Learning Time
Scheduled teaching time 5h 36m 4h 21m 5h 1m 5h 56m 7h 21m 5h 39m
Estimated effective teaching time 2h 44m 1h 41m 3h 42m 2h 55m 3h 24m 2h 53m
Total schools sampled 306 203 760 400 400 2069
Total classes observed 306 203 729 399 398 2035
Panel B: Orphaned Classrooms
Unsupervised classrooms (%) 36 29 19 36 36 31
Total classrooms observed 300 153 721 396 393 1963
Panel C: Teacher Absenteeism
Teachers absent from class (%) 45 56 16 48 52 43
Teachers absent from school (%) 16 43 10 15 23 21
Total teachers sampled 2930 1006 5357 3664 3764 16721
Table 2: Reports the scheduled instruction times, estimated effective teaching
times, unsupervised classrooms, and teacher absenteeism from the classroom
and school. The sampled schools include both government and private schools
and the sample is not weighted. Teachers’ absenteeism data is collected from
the second unannounced visit, whereby they are marked as ’absent from school’
if they are missing from the school premises, and they are marked as ’absent
from the classroom’ if they are not found in the class. The scheduled teaching
time is calculated by deducting break times from the length of the school day.
The estimated effective teaching time is calculated by adjusting the length of
the scheduled teaching time by the share of teachers who are present in the
classroom and by the average time that observed teachers spend teaching while
in the classroom. The unsupervised classrooms label represents a percentage of
classrooms with students inside without the presence of a teacher compared to
the total number of classrooms with students inside, with or without a teacher.
The ’All’ column represents an average of all countries’ totals, whereby each
country is given an equal weight.
The results of the tests administered to teachers across the sample can be
found in Table 3. These results will be used in this thesis as a proxy for teacher
subject knowledge. Following Bold et al. (2017), teachers were deemed to
have the minimum subject knowledge to teach if they corrected over 80% of
the students mistakes accurately. Again following Bold et al.’s categorisation,
on average, 11% of teachers across the sampled countries have the minimum
literacy knowledge to teach 4th grade students in literacy/language, and 71% of




Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Tanzania Uganda All
Panel A: Average Teacher
Literacy/Language Levels
Have the minimum literacy knowledge
to teach in the 4th grade (%)
37 0 0 2 17 11
Can use correct grammar (%) 92 82 66 71 87 80
Can mark student grammar in sentence (%) 1 0 0 1 1 1
Can correct student spelling, grammar,
syntax, and punctuation in a paragraph (%)
52 10 24 22 41 30
Total teachers sampled for testing (%) 771 320 1175 747 702 3715
Panel B: Average Teacher
Mathematics Levels
Have the minimum mathematics knowledge
to teach in the 4th grade (%)
91 52 62 79 69 71
Can add double digits (%) 98 83 89 97 98 93
Can subtract double digits (%) 87 62 70 84 73 75
Can multiply double digits (%) 87 46 62 64 67 65
Can understand a Venn diagram (%) 55 14 26 33 53 36
Can interpret data in a graph (%) 40 2 7 3 8 12
Can solve algebra (%) 76 4 18 46 45 38
Total teachers sampled for testing 791 317 1174 916 738 3936
Table 3: Presents language and mathematics scores of sampled teachers who
currently teach a grade 4 class, or who taught a grade 3 class in the previous year.
This table only reports teachers who teach or taught the subject of interest.
Therefore, if a teacher did not teach mathematics or language, their test results
were not included in this table. These estimates are unweighted and represent
the sample, rather than the wider population of interest. In Panel A, a teacher
is defined the have the ’minimum language knowledge to teach 4th graders’ if
the teacher scored at least 80% on the 3 tasks in their test (1: using grammar, 2:
marking student grammar responses, 3: correcting spelling, grammar, syntax,
and punctuation mistakes in a student letter). In Panel B, a teacher is defined to
have the ’minimum mathematics knowledge to teach 4th graders’ if the teacher
scored at least 80% on the tasks covered in the 4th grade curriculum. Note
that a teacher was required to answer both questions correctly related on the
Venn diagram and graphical data section to be deemed able to understand and
interpret respectively. The ’All’ column represents an average of all countries’
totals, whereby each country is given an equal weight.
Pedagogy represents the method and practice of teaching. Essentially, peda-
gogy levels should explain how well teachers can teach. The findings in Table 4
suggest deficiencies in teachers’ abilities to effectively teach and assess students.
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Teacher Pedagogical Skills
Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Tanzania Uganda All
Panel A: General Pedagogical Knowledge
Percentage of teachers with the minimum
pedagogical knowledge to teach (%)
19 2 2 36 5 13
Average teacher score when comprehending
a factual piece of text (%)
65 25 32 81 50 51
Average teacher score when formulating
aims and learning outcomes (%)
41 12 16 40 19 30
Total teachers sampled for testing 1118 329 1345 1357 1194 5343
Panel B: Assessing Students
Percentage of teachers with the minimum
knowledge to assess students effectively (%)
1 0 0 0 0 0
Average teacher score when formulating
questions to check students’ understanding (%)
55 13 6 53 5 26
Average teacher score when assessing
and comparing students’ abilities (%)
41 10 12 18 24 21
Average teacher score when evaluating
students’ progress (%)
29 6 8 22 10 15
Total teachers sampled for testing 1118 329 1345 1357 1194 5343
Panel C: Average Observed Teacher Skills &
Application Of Practices
Lesson appeared planned (%) 77 71 70 79 47 69
Lesson appeared structured (%) 63 19 60 42 30 43
Asked questions to students with
varied difficulty (%)
34 14 44 42 45 36
Gave positive feedback, praise,
and corrected mistakes (%)
73 28 47 50 76 55
Engaged in all of the above practices (%) 20 1 14 15 5 11
Total observed classes sampled 233 200 721 392 335 1881
Table 4: Presents information on pedagogical skills and classroom observations
of sampled teachers. These estimates are unweighted and represent the sample,
rather than the wider population of interest. The ’All’ column represents an
average of all countries’ totals, whereby each country is given an equal weight.
Panel A reports on the minimum pedagogical knowledge to teach and percentage
scores on specific pedagogical tasks for teachers who currently teach grade 4 or
who taught grade 3 in the previous year. To be deemed to have the minimum
pedagogical knowledge to teach, teachers had to answer at least 80% on the
tasks relating to general pedagogy correctly, which was comprised of the factual
text comprehension and subsequently being able to formulate relevant aims
and learning outcomes on the given topic. Panel B reports on the minimum
knowledge to effectively assess students alongside scores on related tasks for
teachers who currently teach grade 4 or who taught grade 3 in the previous year.
To be deemed to have the minimum knowledge to assess students effectively,
teachers had to answer at least 80% on the tasks relating to assessment, which
was comprised of comparing and monitoring the progress of students. Panel C
presents observed teacher skills and practices in grade 4 classrooms.
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5.2 Data Limitations
In this subsection, I present some concerns regarding the SDI data which may
limit the validity when finding the best predictors of learning outcomes across
the sampled countries.
The SDI data collection method offers a unique data resource in the SSA
region, and hence, the ambitious nature behind the creation of the SDI could
lead to data salience25. Also, the data regarding the quality and availability of
inputs is conventional, but accurately assessing teachers’ ability and teachers’
effort can be more challenging. Hence, the data collected for teachers’ ability and
teachers’ effort should be interpreted as a proxy, and reinforce the assumption
that the SDI data does not perfectly represent true levels of providers’ ability
and effort.
Some elements of the data collection was subjective based on enumera-
tors’ perception, therefore there may be some measurement inaccuracies in the
data26. Also, some designs of the SDI data collection methods were sub-optimal
when creating an environment to effectively proxy variables such as teacher
knowledge27.
Furthermore, the data collection and formatting followed anonymisation
methods to mitigate the risk of breaching the privacy of the respondents in
line with Statistical Disclosure Controls processes28. While this protects the
identity of respondents and follows ethical guidelines, this limits the detail of
analysis which could have been conducted29.
Another issue with the data is the amount of missing observations, which
reduced already small sample sizes, and the lack of information on if these
missing observations reduces the accuracy of the available survey weights. If
the missing observations are randomly distributed, and the sampled schools
were randomly selected, then selection bias will be limited despite the results
not perfectly representing the countries of interest. Also, like most observational
studies, the Hawthorne effect could also prove to be a detrimental feature of this
data collection method30.
25The issue of data salience could exist when political bias may influence the initial variable
selection in the anticipation that it will capture the attention of policy makers, rather than
collecting data on optimal education production function inputs.
26For example, Panel C in Table 4 reports findings on whether a lesson appeared planned
and structured. Also, because data was recorded manually by enumerators, there could be
some inaccuracies due to human error.
27For example, the teacher tests to measure subject knowledge were administered during
their lunch breaks. Resultantly, some teachers may have exerted less effort and less care in
an attempt to complete the tasks as quick as possible in order to maxmimise their effective
break time, leading to measurement errors.
28For an example, Kenya’s SDC process can be downloaded here https://microdata.
worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2755/download/39311.
29For example, if the data showed which teachers directly taught individual students, then
stronger causal claims of teacher characteristics on learning outcomes could be explored from
microeconometric analysis (if the allocation of teachers to teachers was deemed random and
other factors influencing learning outcomes were equally distributed).
30Whereby observed individuals alter their behavior because of their awareness of being
observed and potential implications or benefits that arise from their behaviour. For example,
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The Education Field Manual31 was made to provide guidance to field work-
ers, containing detailed information on procedures for carrying out field data-
collection work to ensure homogeneity in data collection methods. However,
the SDI team recognise that the manual is sub-optimal as it states that versions
will be “updated periodically and supervisors and enumerators are encouraged
to give feedback and recommendations that will enhance the quality and util-
ity of the manual”32. Homogeneity across the data collection is a key concern
and could even extend to student language test difficulty. For effective descrip-
tive comparisons of student learning outcomes, we must assume that there is
no variation in difficulty dependent on the language of the test that was ad-
ministered. But, a direct comparison of the countries is not recommended due
to heterogeneities across the schools selected for sampling and heterogeneities
across recorded variables in each country. Some of the countries have data col-
lected on areas of service delivery where other countries do not33. Furthermore,
I anticipate that categorical data entries for some covariates used in the SDI
data increase measurement errors in the findings in this thesis3435.
6 Empirical Strategy
In this section I present the empirical methods used to help select, quantify, and
statistically test the effect of key predictors of learning outcomes.
To classify the best predictors of learning outcomes, I used machine learning
regularisation methods to initially produce sparse models and help synthesise
the SDI data set by selecting a smaller sub-set of key variables from a large
potential covariate list. These techniques were used to help uncover key asso-
ciations. The use of machine learning techniques in economics for classification
is becoming increasingly popular, potentially due to the rapid increase in data-
driven collection initiatives which sometimes develops at a faster pace than the
economic theories to simplify them. It is important to note that machine learn-
ing methods can utilise infinitely many possible restrictions which can each lead
to a unique solution, so the ambiguous nature of the results are never removed
despite the second visit to schools being unannounced, schools were given a broader time-
period as to when they will receive the second visit, hence some teachers may exert more
effort to attend during this broader period in an attempt to improve the perception of their
effort.
31For an example, Kenya’s Education Field Manual can be downloaded here https://
microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2755/download/39313.
32Some tasks require emotional intelligence, like interviewing. When interviewing, the abil-
ity to build rapport, instil trust, and potentially calm the interviewee can affect the responses
from the interviewee. Hence, a reasonable assumption is that the field manual will not be able
to create perfect homogeneity across enumerators interviewing skills because of pre-existing
heterogeneous levels of emotional intelligence.
33The Mozambique sample has no private schools and the SDI data doesn’t record if schools
have Parent-Teacher Associations in Mozambique and Tanzania.
34For example, variables like teacher age and the total number of teachers per school were
entered into categories with 10 year spans.
35Also, further measurement errors are likely if assuming that one classroom observation
per school from Module 4 is representative of a school average.
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entirely, but rather transferred to the choice of the constraint (Friedman et al.,
2001).
Supervised machine learning regression methods estimate coefficients by ob-
serving inputs and outputs in a training set of observations, whereby inputs are
fed into a learning algorithm which produces given outputs in response to the
artificial learning system. The learning algorithm can impose restrictions on the
function with the motivation to improve the performance of a model with unseen
data. To mimic this setting, a data set can be split into a training and validation
sample. The training sample provides the environment for the machine learn-
ing model to impose restrictions on a given function, and the validation sample
provides an environment to test the performance of the restrictions imposed
by learning from the training sample. The concept of regularisation was first
defined by Ridge regression methods. Hoerl and Kennard (1970) show that the
properties of Ridge regression estimates can improve the mean squared error of
estimation by attempting to reduce the variance of coefficients by imposing a
penalty term to the size of the coefficients. This is also known as shrinkage, or
regularisation. Before conducting any shrinkage, coefficients are typically stan-
dardised. Standardised variables each have mean of 0 and standard deviation of
1 which ensures that the shrinkage doesn’t effect coefficients disproportionately.
The Ridge coefficients minimise a penalised residual sum of squares













In the Ridge minimisation equation 6 (Lagrangian form), λ ≥ 0. The λ
parameter controls the amount of regularisation in the model, therefore λ is
known as a shrinkage parameter because a larger λ value increases the penalty
imposed on coefficients, subsequently leading to more shrinkage of the coef-
ficients. Another way to write the Ridge problem to clearly define the size
constraint imposed on coefficients is














Whereby there is a one-to-one correspondence between λ in equation 6 and
t in equation 7.
However this thesis uses regularisation methods for classification, rather than
prediction and the Ridge penalty cannot directly perform variable selection by
shrinking variable coefficients exactly to 0, unlike the Lasso and Elastic Net
methods. Nevertheless, the fundamental shrinkage ideology stemming from
Ridge regressions help explain Lasso and Elastic Net models. The Lasso model
(Tibshirani, 1996) performs regularisation with the ability of shrinking coeffi-
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cient values to 0. Therefore, the Lasso is able to perform variable selection
which can enhance the interpretability of models.
The Lasso estimate is defined by












|βj | ≤ t.
(8)
In equivalent Lagrangian form, the Lasso problem can be written as















The key difference between the Ridge and Lasso model are the constraints
imposed on the coefficients. The Lasso l1 penalty
∑p
j=1 |βj | will make solutions
non linear for yi, and there is no closed form expression. Hence, computing
the Lasso is a quadratic programming problem and because of the constraint
imposed on the model, coefficients can be shrunk to exactly 0, if t is small
enough. This feature selection element is the key difference between the Lasso




j has a closed form solution
but cannot shrink coefficients exactly to 0.
Figure 1 (Friedman et al., 2001) shows a common visualisation which com-
pares the l2 Ridge regularisation against the l1 Lasso. This picture depicts that
for the same regularisation cost (the blue area) that the two different methods
can result in different solutions.
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Figure 1: Comparing l1 Lasso (left) and l2 Ridge (right) estimations. Shown
are contours of the error and constraint functions. The solid blue areas are the
constraint regions |β1| + |β2| ≤ t and β21 + β22 ≤ t2, respectively, while the red
contours are the contours of the least squares error function.
In Figure 1, the β̂ point shows the least squares fit and the contours represent
different lambda values with the ones furthest away from β̂ representing a larger
lambda. Visibly in Figure 1, the Lasso is able to shrink one of the parameters,
β1 in this case, to 0 because of the properties of the constraint, highlighted by
the blue region. However, in cases where p > N , the Lasso model selects at most
N variables before the model saturates. Also, in the presence of multiple highly
correlated variables, the Lasso tends to select one variable from the group and
ignore the others. The later limitation is particularly inefficient when using the
Lasso method for classification.
But methods to select the optimal amount of shrinkage in regularisation
methods vary. A common way to select the size of the penalty (tuning pa-
rameter) when using Lasso by Cross Validation (CV), a method used in this
thesis.
Briefly to explain, given a training data set (xi, yi), i = 1, ...n and an esti-
mator f̂θ, depending on a tuning parameter θ of some discrete set (θ1, ...θm),
CV estimates the prediction error. In CV, the training data set (1, ...n) is di-
vided into K folds of roughly equal size (in this study K = 10), F1, ...FK . For
k = 1, ...K, consider training on (xi, yi), i /∈ Fk, and validating on (xi, yi), i ∈ Fk.
Then for each tuning parameter value θ ∈ (θ1, ...θm), compute the estimate






2. Then the average error across all folds for each














(yi − f̂−kθ (xi))
2. (10)
Then the value of the tuning parameter which minimises this CV (θ) curve
is chosen
θ̂ = arg min
θ∈(θ1,...θm)
CV (θ). (11)
However, in this thesis the Adaptive Lasso is also used. The Adaptive Lasso
essentially performs a two-stage CV selection. Both Zou (2006) and Bühlmann
and Van de Geer (2011) explore how the Adaptive Lasso can lead to more parsi-
monious models compared to the CV Lasso when over-selection is an issue. The
Adaptive Lasso selection first starts with an initial CV, before then conducting
another CV amongst the selected covariates from the first round. Interestingly
in the second step, weights are applied to the penalised coefficients from the
first step. Therefore, covariates with smaller coefficients are more likely to be




ŵj |βj |. (12)
Where the weight vector can be defined by ŵ = 1/|β̂j |γ (Assuming that β̂ is a
root-n-consistent estimator; for example, β̂ols. Also a positive γ is selected, such
that γ > 0 (Zou, 2006)). Zou (2006) show that the Adaptive Lasso enjoys the
oracle properties36 by using the adaptively weighted l1 penalty. Resultantly, the
Adaptive Lasso tends to lead to more parsimonious models than the CV Lasso.
Specifically in this study, I first followed used the CV Lasso approach with
the aim of selecting a subset of key covariates, smaller than the original covariate
list37. I then used the Adaptive Lasso method to create more parsimonious
models compared to the CV Lasso method, with the hope of increasing the
interpretability of the output.
Zou and Hastie (2005) introduced the Elastic Net penalty in an attempt to
outperform the Lasso model in terms of prediction and interpretability during
classification, while still being attributed with a similar sparsity of represen-
tation. The penalisation penalty introduced by Zou and Hastie incorporates
elements from both the l1 Lasso and l2 Ridge norms, allowing the Elastic Net
to select variables like the Lasso, but collectively shrink correlated predictors
like in the Ridge method. The Elastic Net penalty is be defined by
36The oracle property known when the asymptotic distribution of an estimator is the same
as the asymptotic distribution of the MLE (maximum likelihood estimation) on only the true
support. Therefore, in the context of asymptotic distribution, the estimator adapts to knowing
the true support without paying a price.





(αβ2j + (1− α)|βj |). (13)
Equation (13) shows the combination of the l1 and l2 norm in the Elastic
Net’s penalisation term.
The Elastic Net method encourages a grouping effect, which means that
groups of highly correlated predictors will collectively tend to be in or out of
the model after selection. This is different to the Lasso where certain covariates
from a highly correlated group of covariates can be selected. Hence, in this thesis
I use the Elastic Net method as a type of selection validity check to mitigate
against potential selection errors from the covariates that the Lasso models may
exclude38.
Combining the output from the regularisation methods with the findings
from the causal literature reviewed around improving learning outcomes, I cre-
ated an OLS regression model to uncover coefficients of key predictors closer to
partial derivative effects relating to learning outcomes. The following model39
was estimated for both mathematics and language learning outcomes across
Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, and ’All Countries’40 sam-
ples:
Ai = β0 +β1TSKi +β2TPSi +β3TEi +β4TAi +β5TBi +β6STRi +β7TSTi
+β8Fi+β9PTAi+β10SCi+β11SPSi+β12PSi+β13URi+β14SBi+β15SAi+εi.
(14)
Each observation i represents an average in each selected school from the SDI
sample. Notably, β1, ..., β15 will attempt to uncover the partial derivative effects
rather than highlighting the total derivative effects. Table 5 briefly presents a
list of the covariates used in the OLS model (14). For full descriptions, please
refer to Table 12 in the Appendix.
38With the hope that the Elastic Net models will initially select more covariates compared
to the Lasso models which potentially include key, but correlated, predictors of learning out-
comes.
39Note that no private schools (P ) were sampled in Mozambique, and that no data regarding
Parent-Teacher Associations (PTA) was collected in Mozambique or Tanzania.
40Because of the small sample sizes, and missing observations further crippling the size of





TSKi Teacher Subject Knowledge
TPSi Teacher Pedagogical Skill
TEi Teacher Education that Surpasses Secondary School
TAi Teacher Absenteeism
TBi Positive Teacher Behaviour Index
STRi Student-Teacher Ratio
TSTi Share of Instruction Time Spent Teaching
Fi Facilities Index
PTAi Parent Teacher Association Dummy
SCi School Committee Dummy
SPSi Students Per Classroom Stream
Pi Private School Dummy
Ui Urban Dummy
SBi Students Breakfast
SAi Student Absence Rate
Table 5: Presents the OLS variable list and short descriptions on the right of
the corresponding selected variables.
The OLS models were then tested for heteroskedasticity41 and multicollinear-
ity42 in the form of White (1980), Breusch–Pagan (BP) (1979) and Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF) tests. The VIF process creates auxiliary regressions for
each covariate, to see how much each covariate is being explained by the other
covariates. To avoid initial excess collinearity, where necessary, observations
were averaged at the school level.
41Heteroskedasticity occurs when V (Y |X) is not constant which means that the residuals
do not have a constant variance.
42Multicollinearity occurs when the X variables are correlated strongly with each other,
which leads to obscured coefficients. The regression estimates will then struggle to distinguish
which covariate might be the best predictor of learning outcomes. If present, multicollinearity
will inflate the variance of the affected variables. Therefore, standard errors would be high
and perhaps there would be a lack of statistically significant predictor variables.
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7 Results
In this section, I present the results from the regularisation techniques, OLS
regressions, and tests for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. The Lasso and
Elastic Net methods should help discover what the key predictors of learning
outcomes might be in the SDI data, whereas the OLS method will produce
more quantifiable coefficients which aim to mimic partial derivative effects of
the selected key covariates. Tests for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity
will uncover aspects of how valid the OLS results are.
Firstly across all samples, the CV Lasso method successfully performed vari-
able selection by selecting a group of covariates with non-zero coefficients smaller
than the original list of potential covariates inputted into the models.
Secondly and also across all samples, the Adaptive Lasso method successfully
produced more parsimonious models by performing variable selection which se-
lected a smaller group of covariates with non-zero coefficients compared to the
CV Lasso.
Thirdly, the Elastic Net method successfully produced less parsimonious
models, for the purpose of variable selection validation, by performing variable
selection which selected a larger group of covariates with non-zero coefficients
compared to the CV Lasso and Adaptive Lasso models43.
In terms of prediction, the Adaptive Lasso outperformed the CV Lasso and
Elastic Net methods across all samples44. For statistical summaries of the reg-
ularisation methods, please see section A.5 in the Appendix.
Table 6 reports the largest 3 non-zero post shrinkage coefficients from the
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net methods across all samples.
For full lists of the selected covariates across all samples, please refer to
section A.4 in the Appendix, where the tables also report the selected post-
shrinkage standardised coefficients.
Table 7 and 8 show the OLS regression results for the selected samples
across mathematics and language learning outcomes respectively, following the
estimation equation (14).
Ai = β0 + β1TSKi + β2TPSi + β3TEi + β4TAi + β5TBi + β6STRi + β7TSTi
+β8Fi + β9PTAi + β10SCi + β11SPSi + β12PSi + β13URi + β14SBi + β15SAi + εi
45.
The resultant descriptive statistics for the OLS models can be found in
section A.6, in the Appendix.
43Apart from in Mozambique, where the Elastic Net method selected the same number of
non-zero coefficients as the CV Lasso.
44In terms of having the highest out of sample R2 and lowest CV mean prediction error.
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Top 3 Non-Zero Coefficients From Machine Learning Methods




















































































































Table 6: Shows the top 3 largest post shrinkage coefficients across each sample
and their corresponding coefficient sign. Across the individual models and sam-
ples, the coefficients are ordered so that the largest is top. Note that P = private
school dummy, G3 SPS = students per stream in grade 3, SB = percentage of
children who ate breakfast, STR = student-teacher ratio, Total G4 Boys = total
male students in grade 4, Total Classrooms = total number of classrooms, Total
G3 Students = total number of students in grade 3, TB = teacher behaviour
categorical variable, Student Textbook % = percentage of children in the class-
room who had a textbook, SA = average student absenteeism rate, School Days
= total number of school days in operation, SC Meetings = number of meetings
from the school committee in the year, % Male Teachers = percentage of male
teachers sampled, TSK = proxy for teacher subject knowledge, Teacher Age
= average teacher age, Local Language = if the teacher used a local language
for classroom instruction dummy, G4 SPS = students per stream in grade 4,
Occupied Classrooms = total number of classrooms with students inside, To-
tal Teachers = total number of teachers registered, G3G4 SPS = average of
students per stream across grade 3 and grade 4, Material on Wall = dummy
if material other than students work was displayed on the observed classroom
wall, School Opening Year = year that the school opened, Students Teacher
Visited = total number of students that the teacher individually visited, Toilets
Clean = dummy for if the student toilets were clean, Chalkboard Lux = the
chalkboard lux measure, STR = the school’s student teacher ratio, U = urban
dummy, TPS = teacher pedagogical skill proxy, and Girls’ Toilets = total num-
ber of girls’ toilets. For full variable descriptions and selection lists, please refer
to Appendix sections A.2 and A.4 respectively.
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OLS: Mathematics Learning Outcomes













































































































































































































N 216 176 647 321 321 1,697
R2 0.4686 0.176 0.391 0.3306 0.5230 0.4914














Table 7: Shows the OLS regression results for mathematics outcomes across the
samples. Regression coefficients are reported first, with standard errors reported
in brackets underneath, however the brackets in the F statistic column report
the corresponding P-values. For all coefficients, significance is reported, * = p
< 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Reported coefficients were rounded to 4
decimal places, or to 5 decimal places to capture the first non-zero integer.
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OLS: Language Learning Outcomes













































































































































































































N 219 176 571 306 314 1,603
R2 0.4287 0.3431 0.5575 0.3853 0.6118 0.5758














Table 8: Shows the OLS regression results for language outcomes across the
samples. Regression coefficients are reported first, with standard errors reported
in brackets underneath, however the brackets in the F statistic column report
the corresponding P-values. For all coefficients, significance is reported, * = p
< 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01. Reported coefficients were rounded to 4
decimal places, or to 5 decimal places to capture the first non-zero integer.
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Table 9 shows BP, White, and VIF test results for all sampled OLS mod-
els. Notably, the ’All Countries’ Mathematics, ’All Countries’ Language, and
Nigeria Mathematics models are the only models which show no evidence of
heteroskedasticity or excess multicollinearity46.
OLS Robustness Checks









































































Table 9: Shows the results of the robustness checks for each OLS model. In
the BP Test and White Test columns, the Chi-squared is initially reported, and
then in brackets the probabilities of the null hypothesis, H0, are reported.




The regularisation results from Table 6 suggest that private schools, teacher
subject knowledge, and teacher pedagogical skills could be the best predictors
of learning outcomes captured by the SDI data in the sample of ’All Coun-
tries’47. The complementary OLS results from Tables 7 and 8 show that the
private school, teacher subject knowledge, and teacher pedagogical skills co-
variates also had the largest OLS regression coefficients with mathematics and
language learning outcomes in the ’All Countries’ sample48. Specifically, the
teacher subject knowledge and teacher pedagogical skills covariates had the
largest OLS coefficients in mathematics and language learning outcomes mod-
els respectively, implying that a 1% increase in teachers’ mathematics test scores
were attributed with higher student mathematics test scores of 20.8%, and that
a 1% increase in teachers’ pedagogical test scores were attributed with higher
student language test scores of 37.52%. Both results were statistically significant
at 1%.
Despite the largest coefficients from the ’All Countries’ OLS models in Tables
7 and 8 mimicking the largest post-shrinkage coefficients in Tables 6, ranking
the best predictors of learning outcomes by size of the OLS coefficients is not
optimal because, unlike the regularisation methods, the coefficients from the
OLS analysis are not standardised49.
Across the regularisation results for the individual country samples, the re-
sults vary, but the private school covariate remained prevalent50. In the OLS
analysis, the private school variable was positive and statistically significant at
1% in the models for mathematics and language learning outcomes in the ’All
Countries’ sample, implying that private schools were associated with higher
test scores of 9.76% in mathematics student test scores and 17.66% in language
student test scores. Across all individual country samples for mathematics and
language learning outcomes which included private schools, the OLS coefficient
for private schools was positive and statistically significant, apart from in Tan-
zania where the coefficients were statistically insignificant. These results point
towards a strong association between private schools and higher learning out-
comes for students, but similar to the literature, the positive association between
private schools and learning outcomes fail to distinguish if a lack of random
assignment and un-observable factors are key causal influences driving this ef-
fect ((Angrist, 2002), (Angrist et al., 2006), (Muralidharan and Sundararaman,
47With the 3 covariates most frequently appearing in the top 3 largest post-shrinkage coef-
ficient lists across CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net methods.
48Interestingly, these covariates had larger OLS coefficients when explaining language learn-
ing outcomes compared to mathematics learning outcomes.
49Thus, the effect implied from a regression coefficient from one standard deviation in one
independent variable is not directly comparable to another standard deviation in an alternative
independent variable.
50Apart from in Mozambique where no private schools were sampled. Tanzania represented
the only country in the sample that included private schools where the private school covariate
did not feature in the top 3 largest post shrinkage coefficients across mathematics and language
learning outcomes using the CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net methods.
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2015), (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006), and (Lucas and Mbiti, 2014)).
Again from Table 6 and the ’All Countries’ sample, teacher subject knowl-
edge was highlighted as a key predictor of learning outcomes, which may seem
obvious, but prior literature around the association between teacher subject
knowledge and learning outcomes in SSA is limited. Tables 13 and 14, show that
all regularisation methods selected a positive teacher subject knowledge coeffi-
cient as a key predictor of learning outcomes, with the post-shrinkage covariate
coefficient being the largest, or second largest, across the CV Lasso, Adaptive
Lasso, and Elastic Net methods for both mathematics and language learning
outcomes in the ’All Countries’ sample. Furthermore, the findings presented
in Tables 7 and 8 suggested that a 1% increase in teacher subject knowledge
was associated with higher student mathematics scores of 20.8% and higher lan-
guage scores of 33.6%51. Notably, Table 3 suggests that 71% of the sampled
mathematics teachers had the minimum knowledge to teach mathematics in the
4th grade, and only 11% of the sampled language teachers had the minimum
literacy knowledge to teach in the 4th grade52, highlighting deficiencies in the
knowledge of teachers, which could prove to be beneficial for student learning
outcomes if addressed.
Similarly in Table 6, the ’All Countries’ sample highlighted teacher peda-
gogical skills as a key predictor of learning outcomes and the OLS results in
Tables 7 and 8 show that teacher pedagogical skills had a positive and signifi-
cant association with both mathematics and language learning outcomes at 1%
significance, suggesting that a 1% increase in teachers’ pedagogical skills was
associated with a 17.54% increase in mathematics scores, and a 37.52% increase
in language scores. Despite this, it is estimated that only 13% of the sampled
teachers have the minimum pedagogical knowledge to teach53.
While the regularisation methods used in this thesis were able to perform
variable selection and select key covariates which can be used to predict learning
outcomes, they fail to infer causality and may frequently select covariates that
are highly correlated to learning outcomes with low causal impacts while failing
to select covariates with higher causal impacts. Hence, using Lasso and Elastic
Net methods for classification presents challenges. Arguably, these methods are
more suited for the purpose of prediction, compared to classification problems54.
Nevertheless, the CV Lasso method accomplished selecting a group of covari-
ates, smaller than the original group of covariates which did shed some light
into certain relationships between the selected variables and learning outcomes.
Also, the Adaptive Lasso model succeeded by selecting a smaller subset of co-
variates compared to the CV Lasso model. But, creating sparse explanatory
models for phenomena which may be more complex and diverse in reality, may
not provide much value when the main purpose of the analysis is for classifi-
cation. Considering the tendency of the Lasso models to select one covariate
51Both results were statistically significant at 1%.
52Estimated in Panel’s A and Panel B, and following Bold et al.’s (2017) classification.
53Estimated in Table 4 Panel A, and again following Bold et al.’s (2017) classification.
54Because the CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net choose the optimal level of shrink-
age with the goal of minimising the prediction error.
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from a highly correlated group of covariates provides further issues for classifi-
cation and the Elastic Net method proved valuable by selecting expected key,
and intercorrelated, predictors of learning outcomes which the Lasso models
omitted55. Therefore, the Elastic Net method was useful when performing a
type of validity check for the Lasso variable selection methods.
Also the regularisation methods fail to convey interpretable coefficients mim-
icking partial derivative effects of the education production function. Therefore,
I conducted subsequent OLS56 analysis. I also then tested the statistical signifi-
cance of the covariates, and checked for evidence of heteroskedasticity and excess
multicollinearity. To detect heteroskedasticity, I conducted White and BP tests.
A problem with the BP test is that it assumes that the heteroskedasticity is a
linear function of the selected independent variables, whereas the White test
can accommodate a non-linear relationship between the independent variables
and the error variance. This can explain why the BP test in Table 9 failed to
recognise heteroskedasticity in the models for Kenya and Mozambique language
learning outcomes, despite the White test rejecting the null hypothesis of ho-
moskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity could be present for many reasons; outliers
in the data, and omitted variables are two reasons which I anticipate. To test
for multicollinearity, I conducted VIF analysis, whereby examination of the la-
tent roots and latent vectors of a correlation matrix can provide a sufficient
procedure for detecting multicollinearity (Mansfield and Helms, 1982). Despite
different researchers debating how much multicollinearity is unreasonable and
excessive, no individual VIF scores looked excessively inflated from Table 9 so
I deemed multicollinearity to not be a serious issue with the estimated OLS
results57.
The OLS results, which regressed the selected covariates58 on mathematics
and language learning outcomes in Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, Tan-
zania, and the ’All Countries’ sample, produced an array of results which could
be subject to selection and measurement issues. Also, many variables were not
statistically significant and robustness checks showed signs of heteroskedasticity
in all models apart from Nigeria mathematics, ’All Countries’ mathematics, and
’All Countries’ language59.
Noticeably, the coefficient for the average student breakfast covariate varied
in the mathematics and language ’All Countries’ OLS models. The coefficient
was negative and significant at 5% in the mathematics OLS model, implying
55For example, in the ’All Countries’ mathematics sample (Table 13), and the Kenya math-
ematics sample (Table A.4) the Elastic Net model selected expected key covariates like teacher
absenteeism rates, and teacher subject knowledge, respectively, which the Lasso models omit-
ted.
56The selected covariates forming the OLS models were influenced by the prior machine
learning methods, education production function theory, and the literature reviewed.
57But multicollinearity did clearly affect the varying selection results from the CV Lasso,
Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net methods.
58See Table 12.
59However, by combining all countries into one large sample, countries with comparatively
more observations, like Nigeria, had a greater impact on the results compared to other coun-
tries will less observations.
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that an 1% increase in children who ate breakfast before attending school was
associated with lower student mathematics test scores by 2.28%. But, the coef-
ficient in the language model was positive and also significant at 5%, implying
that an 1% increase in children who ate breakfast before attending school was
associated with higher student language test scores by 3.82%. The differing co-
efficient signs for the average student breakfast covariate highlight an interesting
focus for further research as this variable could even proxy elements related to
household’s demand for education.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the OLS results from Tables 7 and 8 show that
teacher absenteeism rates and learning outcomes had a negative relationship
for the ’All Countries’ mathematics and language models, this relationship was
significant at 10% in both models. Similarly, the teacher absenteeism post
shrinkage coefficient was negative when selected in the ’All Countries’ mathe-
matics and language regularisation models. But notably, for mathematics, only
the Elastic Net model selected the teacher absenteeism covariate, whereas in the
alternate language model, the CV Lasso and Elastic Net methods did choose
the covariate as a key predictor. The descriptive findings from Table 2 esti-
mate that teachers are absent from class 43% of the time, as an average of all
sampled countries, and again this highlights a striking deficiency in the pro-
vision of schooling across the sampled schools. Perhaps changing the contract
structure for teachers which incentivises attendance could prove beneficial for
student learning outcomes ((Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2013), (Duflo
et al., 2012)).
Also in the ’All Countries’ OLS models, the coefficient for the facilities index
was positive and significant at 1% for both mathematics and language learning
outcomes. Also not only for the ’All Countries’ regularisation models, but also in
the individual countries samples, an array of physical schooling inputs/facilities
were selected across CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, and Elastic Net frameworks.
But, quantifying the effect of specific facilities and physical schooling inputs
remains challenging ((Glewwe et al., 2009), (Sabarwal et al., 2014), (Borkum
et al., 2012), (Glewwe et al., 2004)).
Nevertheless, I would not expect the true partial derivative effects to be
identical to the OLS coefficients presented in this thesis60. A key omission when
exploring the best predictors of learning outcomes in this study is a variable
for innate ability. Ability is notoriously hard to measure, and perhaps the
SDI data provides a proxy for ability if data regarding students’ non-verbal
test scores were used. However, I opted not to use this data as a potential
control, because I believed that these results would not have been independent
from effects of school related covariates. Hence, the Conditional Independence
Assumption (CIA) would not hold and this would have been a poor control
variable when trying to infer causality. Perhaps future studies could follow
Lara et al.’s (2011) propensity score econometric techniques and changes-in-
changes estimation methods with data which contains the previous academic
60Due to omitted variables, selection issues, and also measurement issues with some co-
variates (Especially covariates derived from Module 4 of the SDI data where one observation
formed a school’s average).
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achievement levels of students to address concerns for differences in students’
unobservable characteristics. This approach would also complement Todd and
Wolpin’s (2003) recommended approach.
While the results presented in this study do not imply causality, and could
suffer from selection and measurement problems, the regularisation methods
enabled feature selection, and ranking, of covariates, which provided some in-
sight when exploring the best predictors of learning outcomes. The subsequent
OLS results presented more interpretable coefficients between key covariates
and learning outcomes which most likely represent biased partial derivative ef-
fects. The OLS results also highlighted contradictory relationships between the
percentage of children who ate breakfast before attending school and the associ-
ation with mathematics and language learning outcomes in the ’All Countries’
model, perhaps a future study could explore these findings further61.
To discover what the best predictors of learning outcomes are for progressive
education policy decisions in SSA, more data is needed to estimate truer partial
derivative effects, while experimental designs could aid the discovery of what
the total derivative effects from the resultant policy actions might be.
9 Conclusion
This thesis further highlights deficiencies in the provision of education and learn-
ing outcomes across the sampled schools in SSA. The regularisation methods
were able to standardise variables and perform feature selection to uncover what
the best predictors of learning outcomes could be in the SDI data. The selection
methods produced an array of results across the sample, but the private school
covariate was often selected as a key predictor of learning outcomes. Other
prominent covariates were related to teacher subject knowledge and teacher
pedagogical skills62. Firstly, I used the CV Lasso method to perform variable
selection, before using the Adaptive Lasso method to produce even more parsi-
monious models63. Then, I used the Elastic Net method as a selection validity
check because of the tendency for Lasso models to exclude highly correlated
covariates. The Elastic Net method proved that the Lasso methods omitted
expected key predictors of learning outcomes64.
I then conducted OLS analysis to discover quantifiable associations between
key covariates and learning outcomes. The OLS results suggested that many of
the samples suffered from heteroskedastic errors and it is anticipated that the
coefficients do not mimic true partial derivative effects. The omission of key
unobservable factors which influence student test results must also be noted.
Nevertheless, the OLS results uncovered some peculiar results65 and showed
61Assuming that the student breakfast covariate is a proxy for unobserved household charac-
teristics like income and parental education, a negative relationship with mathematics learning
outcomes is baffling and remains unexplained.
62Specifically in the ’All Countries’ sample.
63In the hope of enhancing the interpretability of a smaller group of selected covariates.
64Like teacher subject knowledge and teacher absenteeism rates.
65relating to the varying associations between the average student breakfast covariate and
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that the teacher subject knowledge and teacher pedagogical skills covariates
had the largest OLS coefficients in mathematics and language learning outcomes
models, respectively, in the ’All Countries’ sample.
While the results from the CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso, Elastic Net, and
OLS analysis did not imply causality, and may have suffered from selection and
measurement problems, the regularisation methods enabled feature selection
and ranking of covariates which provided insight into further areas for research
and data collection initiatives when exploring the best predictors of learning
outcomes.
Future research efforts could extend the data collection methods and con-
duct experimental analysis to explore the total derivative effects of education
production function inputs which can uncover household behaviour in response
to policy implementation. If extending the data collection initiative further
to households proves too challenging66, then future studies could follow Lara
et al.’s (2011) propensity score econometric techniques and changes-in-changes
estimation methods with data containing the previous academic achievement
levels of students which complements Todd and Wolpin’s (2003) recommended
approach.
learning outcomes.
66Due to research ethics and processes which must be followed to maintain the confidentiality
of agents, open source data with the ability of individual tracking may be unfeasible.
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To track the quality of service delivery in primary schools, SDI researchers em-
barked on nationwide data collection field trips whereby enumerators visited
sampled schools (which contained at least one 4th-grade class) to complete sur-
veys, distribute questionnaires, and administer assessments67. The SDI research
team created a Education Field Manual to help with operational deployment
of data collection agents. Each sampled school was visited twice, the first visit
was announced and the second visit was unannounced, with the later aiming
to capture teacher absenteeism data. Refer to Table 10 for enumerators’ data
collection schedule during observational visits.
SDI Enumerator Data Collection
1st Visit (Announced)
Enumerator 1 Enumerator 2
- Arrive at school
- Meet with principle/head teacher, or the most senior teacher present
- Make an introduction, explain the purpose of the visit, and confirm their permission to collate data
- Complete Module 1 (school information)
- Complete Module 2A (list of teachers)
- Select a sample of 10 teachers
- Complete Module 2B (accompanied by a staff
member from the school, randomly select and interview
10 to collect personal and absence information)
- Complete Module 3 (school finances, either with
the principle/head teacher or school accountant/
treasurer)
- Complete Module 4 (observe a fourth-grade
mathematics or language lesson)
- Complete Module 5 (randomly select 10 pupils
from the fourth-grade class and administer the pupil test)
- Complete Module 6 (during the lunch break, administer
the teacher test to all fourth-grade teachers,
the previous year’s third-grade teacher, and 3-5 teachers
who teach the fifth-grade and above
2nd Visit (Unannounced)
- Arrive at school
- Meet with the principle/head teacher again to ask for permission again to collate data
- Accompanied with a member of staff, collect attendance data of the 10 pre-selected teachers from the 1st visit
- Conduct interviews with the teachers that were not present during the 1st visit to complete Module 2B
(personal and absence information)
- Count the number of unstaffed classrooms
- Collect any outstanding information to complete all Modules
Table 10: Highlights the structure that enumerators followed when visiting sam-
pled schools and collecting data.
67For an example, Kenya’s Service Delivery Indicators Education Survey Questionnaire





Modules Data Sources Descriptions
Module 1 - School Information Head Teacher
Collects information about school type,
facilities, governance, student numbers and schools hours.
Module 2 - Teacher Roster
Head Teacher and
Sampled Teachers
Collects a list of school teachers,
while measuring absences rates and collecting
information regarding teacher characteristics.
Module 3 - School Finances Head Teacher Collects information regarding school finances.
Module 4 - Classroom Observations
Classroom
Observations
An observations module to monitor teacher behaviour
and classroom conditions.
Module 5 - Pupil Assessment Sampled Pupils
Organises and marks assessments to collects grade 4 test results
in language/literature and mathematics.
Module 6 - Teacher Assessment Sampled Teachers
Organises and marks teacher’s assessments as for proxies for their
language and mathematics subject knowledge, while also measuring
pedagogical skill.
Table 11: Presents SDI module descriptions.
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Figure 2: Shows the full variable list used by the ’All Countries’, Kenya, Mozam-
bique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda samples. Note that, ’av student math p’
and ’av student lang p’ are the proxies for learning outcomes. The ’All Coun-
tries’, Mozambique, and Tanzania samples are all missing the ’m1 pta’ and
’m1 pta meet lastyr’ variables, hence they have 106 potential variables, com-
pared to the other samples with 108.
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The dependant variable, represents school-averaged mathematics or language test results and proxies learning outcomes.
This variable represents an average test result for the 10 randomly selected grade 4 students in each school.
The average scores were compiled with equal weights for each pupil test score.
This data comes from Module 5 in the SDI data.
TSKi
An independent continuous variable, represents school-averaged teacher subject (either mathematics or language) test results as a percentage
and proxies teacher subject knowledge. The average scores were compiled with equal weights for each teacher test score.
This data comes from Module 6 in the SDI data. Here, I employed a two-stage sample restriction on the teachers included where firstly,
teachers were only included if they taught in grade 4 in the year of the data collection, or if they taught in grade 3 in the previous year.
Secondly, the teachers who taught the dependent variable subject were included
(So for example, only teachers who taught either grade 4 or grade 3 mathematics were included in the regression analysing mathematics learning outcomes).
TPSi
An independent continuous variable, represents school-averaged teacher pedagogy test results as a percentage and proxies teacher pedagogical skill.
The school-averaged scores were compiled with equal weights for each sampled teacher test score. This data comes from Module 6 in the SDI data
and averages teacher test results from Task 3 (Preparing to teach) Task 4 (Assessing differences in children’s abilities as learners) and
Task 5 (Evaluating the learning achievements and progress of students), where percentage averages from each task were given an equal
weight in the creation of this variable. I employed the same two-stage sample restriction on the teachers where firstly, teachers were only
included if they taught in grade 4 in the year of the data collection, or if they taught in grade 3 in the previous year, and within that sample,
the teachers who taught the dependent variable subject of interest were then included.
TEi
An independent continuous variable, represents the percentage of the sampled teachers tested in Module 6 of the SDI data that have attained an
official education that surpasses secondary school. This variable represents a limited proxy for teacher education. Each sampled teacher had an
equal weight when calculating this variable and converting the individual categorical information into a school-average continuous variable.
Again, I employed the same two-stage sample restriction on the teachers where firstly, teachers were only included if they taught in grade 4 in the
year of the data collection, or if they taught in grade 3 in the previous year, and within that sample, the teachers who taught the dependent variable
subject of interest were then included.
TAi
An independent continuous variable, represents school-averaged percentages of teachers who were absent from the classroom, or the school, during
the second unannounced SDI visit. This variable is intended to act as a proxy for teacher absenteeism. Each sampled teacher had an equal weight
when calculating this variable and converting the individual categorical information into a school-average continuous variable. Again, I employed
the same two-stage sample restriction on the teachers where firstly, teachers were only included if they taught in grade 4 in the year of the data
collection, or if they taught in grade 3 in the previous year, and within that sample, the teachers who taught the dependent variable subject of interest
were then included.
TBi
An independent discrete variable, represents a total of observed teacher behaviour and practices from Module 4 (classroom observation) in the SDI data.
Note that in each school, there was a maximum of 1 classroom observation. This variable totals binomial entries (1 = observed, 0 = not observed) for
the following practices: If the teacher used local information to make learning relevant, if the teacher either sat or stood in front of the class at any time,
if the teacher visited individual children, if the teacher asked questions that required students to recall information, if the teacher asked students to carry out a task,
if the teacher asked questions that required students to apply information, if the teacher asked questions which required students to use their creativity,
if the teacher gave feedback or praise/moral strengthening/encouragement to students, if the teacher introduced the lesson at the start of the class,
if the teacher summarised the lesson at the end of the class, if the teacher assigned homework to the class, and if the teacher reviewed or collected homework from
the class. This variable is intended to act as a proxy for positive teaching behaviour. Note that the classroom observation was either for a mathematics or language
4th grade lesson.
STRi
An independent continuous variable, represents an ambiguous student-teacher ratio score for each school. This variable divides information from
Module 1 (total number of students) by information from Module 2 (total number of teachers) and is ambiguous because the total number of teachers
for each school was rounded to the nearest multiple of 10. Therefore, entries where the total number of teacher were rounded to 0, I changed these
entries to 1. Hence, I reluctantly include this variable as a proxy for student-teacher ratios, with expectations of measurement issues stemming from
the SDI data collection and input methods.
TSTi
An independent continuous variable, represents the estimated share of instruction time that is spent teaching for each school.
This variable is the estimated share of time spent teaching during instruction time in each school. This indicator was compiled from observing 1
fourth-grade language or mathematics class for 1 hour in each school. Hence this variable is also subject to ambiguity.
Fi
An index of facilities score and is a created independent discrete variable representing a binomial total of facilities in each school.
This index was calculated by binomially totalling (1 = observed, 0 = not observed) if each school had designated toilets for pupils, gender specific
toilets, if the toilets were clean, if the toilets were private, if the 1 observed language or mathematics class per school had a corner library,
if the same observed class had a board for teachers to write on, if the same observed class had chalk or a pen to use the board,
and if the same observed class had working electricity. Therefore the maximum total here was 8.
PTAi A dummy variable for if the school has a parent teacher association.
SCi A dummy variable for if the school has a school committee.
SPSi
An independent continuous variable, represents the average number of pupils per stream across grade 3 and grade 4 in each school.
This variable builds on the literature of classroom sorting by also incorporating the size of the ability-based groups.
PSi A private school dummy variable for if the school is private.
Ui A dummy variable for if the school is located in an urban area.
SBi
An independent continuous variable, represents the percentage of students who ate breakfast before starting school, for each school.
This variable was compiled by creating a percentage average of the 10 randomly selected grade 4 students (who were initially sampled for testing)
and were asked if they had eaten breakfast that day. In this creation of this school average, each student was given an equal weight.
SAi
An independent continuous variable, represents the average student absence rate in each school.
This variable was calculated by dividing the total number of absent students by the total number of registered students in the one
observed 4th grade language or mathematics class in each school.
Table 12: OLS variable descriptions. Note that Mozambique and Tanzania are
the two countries in the sample where the PTA variable is not included in the
baseline regression, due to omission in the SDI data. Also in the baseline regres-
sion model for Mozambique, the P variable is also excluded due to no private
schools being sampled. Furthermore, Due to some data entry irregularities, 2
variable entries were dropped for SA in Kenya, 1 in Mozambique, 6 in Nigeria,
and 5 in Tanzania.
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A.4 Selected Covariates: Standardised Post-Shrinkage Co-
efficients
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All Countries Mathematics Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
average math teacher score .0381214 .0380981 .0280888
private .0369675 .039729 .0253732
average mathteacher pedagogy .0134718 .0119342 .0075756
teacher student ratio -.0127152 -.0129189 -.0105847
m1 girls n toilets .0116338 .0145934 .0097356
m4d pup grade rec -.0093585 -.0080716 -.0082904
m1 sc meet lastyr .0089891 .0128042 .0009434
student absence -.0080609 -.0085059 -.0084376
m1 toilets clean .0078735 .0087575 .0072247
m4b material .0073842 .0086342 .007437
pencilpen80 .0059103 .0082883 .006229
m4c teach hw .0052947 .0071029 .0050436
average male math teacher -.0050867 -.0082176 -.0055769
m2 n cl wchild .0049942 .001414 .005984
m1 toilets accessible .0049438 .0073847 .0060632
m2 n classrooms .0049019 .0067869 .0069672
m4c txtbook teacher .0049002 .0059743 .0059077
g3g4 pps -.0046381 -.0085187 -.0033483
m4c teach feedback .0042593 .0073178 .0052123
m4c teach local lang -.0042295 -.0055735 -.0043812
m4d n reg pup -.0041434 -.0083024 -.0043124
perc students usedtextbook .0039102 .0029577 .0036046
average MT3 teacher .0037755 .0045836 .00755
av teacher edu diploma math .0037414 .008828 .0059319
m1 boys toilets .0036053 .0043315 .0067536
m4d workscheme mt -.0027425 -.0028621 -.0040626
m1 gender toilets .002505 .003319 .0034799
urban .0023211 .0028316 .0036736
m1 school type .0021361 .004456 .0046474
perc students usedpaperpen .0020574 .0044385 .003444
m4c teach sitting -.0020546 -.0081237 -.0042063
m4c teach feed scold -.0016854 -.0055127 -.003723
m4 light front .0015653 .0048587 .003025
m1 days in session .0014257 .0045089 .0037553
m4c teach intro .0013946 .0040008 .0027223
m4 tid .0013942 .0044169 .0032801
m4 lux measure -.0013829 -.0024256 -.003141
m4c teach summary .0010892 .0004026 .0031074
m4b classroom hyg -.0004873 -.0024047
m4c teach hit -.0003736 -.0016686
m1 n boys g4 -.0003076 -.0029655
m1 toilets .0002998 .0016902
m4c teach smile -.0001965 -.0034556
average math teacher age -.0001625 -.0042904
m4 light back .0001599 .0028111
m4c teach recall .0000987 .0037607
m1 sc meet lastyr .0086327
m1 streams g4 -.0043102
m1 school year .0037549
m2 n teachers .0036586
av mathteacher absenteeism -.0033975
m1 streams g3 pps -.0032232
average MT5 teacher .0030679
m4b board contrast .0028934
m1 streams g4 pps -.0028602
average MT4 teacher .0026925
m1 streams g3 -.002562
m4c teach indch -.0019658
m1 sc minutes .0019175
m4c teach apply -.0018942
share teaching -.001735
m2 n cl wchild noteach .0016623
m4c teach hw corr .0016438
m4b electricity .0014968
m4c teach localinfo -.0014863
exbook80 .0012781
m4d offic records -.0011899
m4c teach feed cor .001081
av teacher edu secondary math -.0007847
m4b cornerlibrary .0006718
teacher behaviour .0006226
m1 toilets private .0005774
m4c teach indch n -.0004896
m1 school cat .0004556
m1 n total g4 -.0004385
perc students withtextbook .0002947
m4b work displayed .0002649
av teacher edu bachelors math -.0002217
m4c board teacher -.0001536
m4b board -.0000969
m4c teach task .0000521
Table 13: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the ’All Countries’ sam-
ple when predicting mathematics learning outcomes (106 potential covariates).
Rounded to 7 decimal places. 62
All Countries Language Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
private .0640232 .067441 .0625998
average lang teacher score .0480749 .0506121 .0468938
average langteacher pedagogy .0268615 .0260523 .0257647
m1 n boys g4 -.0261279 -.0293591 -.0245819
m4b material .0247859 .0262271 .0245336
student absence -.0240224 -.0245724 -.0239529
m2 n teachers .0218717 .0319937 .020747
m4d n reg pup -.0216731 -.0258219 -.0208423
teacher student ratio -.0202674 -.01673 -.0207382
teacher behaviour .0186675 .0253504 .0180045
average student breakfast .0175088 .0215265 .0173248
urban .017267 .0182416 .0173034
m1 boys toilets .0171977 .0226752 .0165956
m1 sc meet lastyr .0168654 .0198304 .0166634
m2 n cl wchild .0165118 .0151767 .0167811
m1 streams g4 -.0151943 -.0225411 -.0157387
m4c teach local lang -.0148626 -.0170563 -.0148468
m1 streams g3 pps -.0130326 -.0170819 -.0109089
m4b txtbook class .0123772 .0165135 .0119769
average male lang teacher -.0109876 -.0135311 -.0108303
m1 toilets clean .0108181 .0117796 .0107859
average LT3 teacher .0106155 .0102004 .0113978
m4c txtbook teacher .0105384 .0108297 .0105692
m4c teach sitting -.0099562 -.0169755 -.009299
m1 girls n toilets .0097183 .0073611 .0101033
m4 tid .009597 .0111685 .0096983
m4d pup grade rec -.0089123 -.0062666 -.0092449
m2 n classrooms .0088225 .0089481 .0090183
m4d workscheme mt -.0082955 -.0082935 -.008381
m4b board .0072477 .0095632 .0071697
m1 school type .0071326 .0070405 .0073939
m1 toilets .0063929 .0058181 .0064217
perc students usedtextbook .0062114 .006908 .0062448
m1 toilets accessible .0059264 .0049286 .0061348
m4 light front .0059134 .0071146 .0059086
m4b cornerlibrary .0057738 .0058724 .0057274
m4b classroom hyg -.0057551 -.0050482 -.0059143
pencilpen80 .0055696 .0055665 .0057229
m4b electricity .0053785 .0046438 .0056698
m4c teach creativity .0046062 .0002644 .0050025
m4b board contrast .0041202 .0040619 .0041301
perc students withtextbook .0033065 .0034206
m4c teach localinfo -.0032858 -.0030568 -.0032142
m4b chalk .0026592 .002798
m4c teach summary .0020726 .0023836
m4c teach feed scold -.0020388 -.0021554
av langteacher absenteeism -.0017056 -.00175
av teacher edu secondary lang -.0012746 -.0014653
av teacher edu primary lang .0005197 .0005428
m1 toilets private .0003501 .0006824
g3g4 pps -.0033094
average LT4 teacher .0008012
m4c teach hw corr .0001682
Table 14: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the ’All Countries’
sample when predicting language learning outcomes (106 potential covariates).
Rounded to 7 decimal places. 63
Kenya Mathematics Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
private .0287714 .0334464 .0171185
m1 streams g3 pps -.0176629 -.0236639 -.0077051
average student breakfast .0141288 .0164755 .0103656
av mathteacheredu gtss .0092913 .0123183 .0061724
teacher student ratio -.0091916 -.0114057 -.0096893
m4 tid .0085197 .0145168 .0068968
m1 pta -.0079434 -.0112649 -.0073183
m4c teach hw corr .007817 .0143029 .0054115
m4c teach indch -.0076075 -.0109652 -.0061245
m1 days in session .0073123 .0116855 .0060491
m1 sc meet lastyr .0064161 .0150263 -.0017654
av teacher edu bachelors math -.0056787 -.0121947 -.004737
m4 light front .0056207 .012319 .004828
m4c board pup .0047373 .0086327 .0035622
m2 n cl wchild noteach -.004719 -.0074333 -.0036115
m4b material .0047183 .0052091 .0054116
m1 school year .0044285 .0058927 .0085221
m1 n boys g4 -.0036445 -.0058778 -.0027478
m4b board contrast .0034859 .0100848 .0029564
average math teacher age .003485 .0104452 .0022691
urban .0034592 .0066322 .0024889
m4b electricity .0033832 .0043561 .0040594
perc students withtextbook .0032021 .0043267
m4d offic records .0031571 .0096034 .0010566
m4d n abs pup -.0031019 -.0034392 -.0036354
share teaching .0030502 .0040577 .0030668
m4c teach summary .0029598 .0022061 .0040955
perc students usedtextbook .0018851 .0048249 .0016896
m4d pup grade rec .0014843 .0009221 .0020964
m4c board teacher -.0013456 -.0042178 -.0013006
m1 school cat -.001073 -.0007773 -.0006239
student absence -.0008618 -.0014325
m4c txtbook teacher -.0003636 -.0007052
av mathteacher absenteeism -.0000872 -.0030317
av teacher edu diploma math .0000843 .0017664
m4c teach creativity .0000195 .001177
urb rur semi -.0000125 -.0024888
g3g4 pps -.005419
m1 sc meet lastyr .0041669
m1 streams g4 pps -.0021904
m1 n total g4 -.0017645
average math teacher score .0015313
m4c txtbook pup -.0013776
m1 n total g3 -.00111
average male math teacher -.0009463
pencilpen80 -.0008947
m1 toilets clean .0008643
average MT3 teacher .0007139
av teacher edu primary math .0003213
m4c teach feedback -.0001804
oprhaned classrooms -.0001707
m4c teach recall -.0001373
exbook80 -.0001292
Table 15: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Kenya sample when
predicting mathematics learning outcomes (108 potential covariates). Rounded
to 7 decimal places. 64
Kenya Language Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
m1 streams g3 pps -.0349797 -.02667 -.0329575
private .0268946 .0292771 .0256272
average student breakfast .0220944 .0170683 .0215739
m4 tid .015099 .0187283 .0145934
m1 n total g3 -.0146787 -.0401386 -.0156737
m2 n classrooms .0135627 .0441026 .0136216
teacher student ratio -.0128955 -.0029445 -.012589
student absence -.0124371 -.0147612 -.0114912
m4b board .0114721 .0142332 .0115016
m4b cornerlibrary .0112362 .0214715 .0108078
m1 n boys g4 -.0109477 -.0446851 -.0115702
av teacher edu secondary lang -.0099945 -.016983 -.0097563
m1 days in session .0083448 .0107453 .0081883
m4c teach hw .0076963 .0121688 .0077765
m4b material .0076807 .0112576 .0079802
urban .0070614 .0014728 .0039175
m4d n abs pup -.0065993 -.0048988 -.0078057
pencilpen perc .0062719
average LT5 teacher .0061739 .0101074 .0064552
av langteacheredu gtss .005888 .0079782 .0056876
m1 pta meet lastyr -.0047464 -.0112245 -.0052946
m4b txtbook class .0045387 .0113637 .0047966
m4d pup grade rec .0036283 .0189635 .0042513
m4 light front .0034284 .0110532 .0037951
m1 sc -.0033955 -.0046164 -.0038431
m4b work displayed .0033266 .0112651 .0038148
perc students usedpaperpen -.0017481 -.0156762 -.0023481
m4c teach summary .0017014 .0050135 .0021157
m2 n teachers .0011085 .030038 .0022021
m4c teach sitting -.000968 -.0123485 -.0013234
m4d workscheme mt -.0001903 -.0154343 -.0011887
urb rur semi -.0000662 -.0039196
perc students withpen .0184365 .0068067
m4c teach feed cor .0000994
Table 16: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Kenya sample when
predicting language learning outcomes (108 potential covariates). Rounded to
7 decimal places.
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Mozambique Mathematics Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
teacher behaviour .0107709 .0121503 .0098451
perc students withtextbook .0091012 .0145021 .00849
student absence -.0085116 -.0137211 -.0080166
perc students usedtextbook .0043093 .0087225 .0043062
m1 days in session .0035953 .0126837 .0031921
pencilpen80 .0035493 .0108729 .0031968
m4d lessonplan .0033103 .0077637 .0032734
m4c teach hw .0029938 .0086765 .0032567
m4c teach sitting .0029868 .0084131 .0029657
pencilpen perc .0022802 .0024196
average math teacher score .0009527 .0032604 .0010944
Table 17: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Mozambique sam-
ple when predicting mathematics learning outcomes (106 potential covariates).
Rounded to 7 decimal places.
Mozambique Language Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
student absence -.0529525 -.0816415 -.053211
teacher behaviour .036136 .0526999 .0365984
m1 sc meet lastyr .0186532 .0342016 .0193933
perc students withtextbook .0183699 .0324013 .0188603
m4c teach hit .0089493 .0010762 .0093028
m4b txtbook class .0075354 .0076445
perc students usedtextbook .0061516 .0066241
m4b material .001371 .0019194
Table 18: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Mozambique sam-
ple when predicting language learning outcomes (106 potential covariates).
Rounded to 7 decimal places.
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Nigeria Mathematics Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
private .032262 .0320647 .0236345
average male math teacher -.022444 -.0239897 -.0164161
average math teacher score .0186822 .0211053 .0142373
average math teacher age -.0177715 -.0236449 -.0152453
perc students withtextbook .016833 .0192886 .0121204
perc students withpen .0151326 .0184251
m1 days in session .011873 .0149321 .0100871
av mathteacher absenteeism -.010173 -.0144437 -.0093512
m1 school year .0097624 .0128444 .0105826
m4b exbook -.0085582 -.0188927 -.0052074
m2 n classrooms .008245 .0127434 .0061878
m4c teach local lang -.0081519 -.0101347 -.0086139
m1 girls n toilets .0081419 .0116388 .0054069
perc students usedpaperpen .0076158 .0098893 .0079431
av teacher edu diploma math .007144 .0092479 .006413
m4d n reg pup -.0071345 -.0050569 -.007152
m4b material .0071296 .0097299 .0065339
m4b classroom hyg -.0063531 -.0071342 -.0076105
m4c teach task .0063222 .0105651 .0067723
m4d lessonplan .0062915 .0067838 .0061646
m4c teach apply -.0061097 -.0104215 -.0067069
m1 sc .0054832 .0110208 .0042135
average MT3 teacher .0047713 .0045573 .0072074
m4c teach localinfo -.0045698 -.0033281 -.0064495
m4 light front .0042002 .0077825 .0038321
m4b room boys -.0037325 -.0043893
av teacher edu secondary math -.0036026 -.0029277 -.0032302
av mathteacheredu gtss .0032125 .0038703 .0038707
share teaching -.0028254 -.0055275 -.0027629
m4b electricity .0025787 .0006703 .0036627
m4b board -.0025025 -.0021795 -.0041168
m4c board teacher -.0023322 -.0039661 -.0026917
m4c teach summary .0022017 .0044863
m4 lux measure -.0021248 -.0039815
m2 n cl wchild .0017115 .0057345
average MT5 teacher .0015547 .0034587
m4c teach sitting -.0015264 -.0024307
m4c teach feed cor -.0012933 -.0031477
perc students usedtextbook .0008187 .004569
m1 sc meet lastyr .0007747 .0029008
av teacher edu primary math -.0007011 -.0022589
m4c teach smile -.0006512 -.0031587
m2 n teachers .0005914 .0020352
m1 school cat .0005549 .0013516
m4d pup grade rec -.0002315 -.0031297
m1 school type -.0001196 -.0015251
m4c teach recall .0000152 .0027089
pencilpen perc .0121404
m4b room total -.002829
m1 boys toilets .002776
m1 n total g3 -.0022696
m4c board pup .0021175
m1 sc minutes -.0021117
m4 light back .0019432
oprhaned classrooms -.0017906
m1 toilets accessible .0017387
exbook perc .0016138
m4c teach feed scold .0015445
m1 toilets clean .0014993
m4c teach creativity -.0011509
m4b pencilpen -.001118
m1 pta meet lastyr .0010739
m4c teach intro .0010627
average MT4 teacher -.0009275
m4 tid .0009271
student absence -.0009264
m4b work displayed -.0009178
average mathteacher pedagogy .0005523
m1 toilets private .0004781
m4c teach indch -.0002734
m1 streams g3 pps -.0002663
teacher student ratio -.0002451
g3g4 pps -.0002192
urb rur semi -.0001797
Table 19: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Nigeria sample when
predicting mathematics learning outcomes (108 potential covariates). Rounded
to 7 decimal places. 67
Nigeria Language Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
private .0791889 .0807118 .0683292
perc students withtextbook .0384576 .0409056 .0334462
m4c teach local lang -.0357742 -.0428589 -.0361086
g3g4 pps -.0317633 -.0393919 -.0143628
m4b material .0247524 .0307731 .0226655
m2 n cl wchild .023303 .0254459 .0232876
m4b classroom hyg -.023194 -.0266701 -.0216679
average LT3 teacher .0227227 .026665 .0220442
m1 toilets clean .0158711 .0168724 .0012751
average langteacher pedagogy .0155081 .0161019 .0156767
urban .0119721 .0134702 .0128162
av langteacher absenteeism -.0118805 -.0198301 -.0122374
m2 n teachers .0117916 .0185129 .0114728
m4 light front .0101001 .0205055 .0105535
m1 school year .0096773 .0192022 .0155609
average male lang teacher -.009422 -.0087256 -.0104162
m4c teach intro .0093971 .0150409 .0080994
oprhaned classrooms -.0088379 -.0092134 -.009669
perc students usedtextbook .0087585 .0104456 .0106895
m4c teach task .0077804 .0114408 .0086604
m4c teach creativity .0073777 .0078922 .0077391
average lang teacher score .0072491 .0077697 .008529
m4d n abs pup -.0069817 -.003203 -.009172
average student breakfast .0066945 .009306 .0079428
pencilpen perc .0065469 .0078107
av langteacheredu gtss .0052206 .0110171 .0057932
m4c teach summary .0038363 .0014632 .0049739
m4 tid .0036198 .004925
perc students usedpaperpen .002555 .0018692
m4d lessonplan .0017238 .0027151
m4c txtbook teacher .001087 .0017469
m1 pta meet lastyr .0005562 .0018365
perc students withpen .0071941
m1 toilets clean .0156608
m1 streams g4 pps -.0105264
m1 streams g3 pps -.0084582
m4b electricity .0023402
m4c bookpen n pup .0020373
m4c board pup .0019116
m1 sc minutes -.0016564
m4b chalk .0010227
m1 toilets private .0010187
av teacher edu primary lang .0006925
m4 lux measure -.0006066
m1 days in session .0005378
m4c teach feed scold .0001575
Table 20: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Nigeria sample when
predicting language learning outcomes (108 potential covariates). Rounded to
7 decimal places. 68
Uganda Mathematics Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
m1 streams g4 pps -.0212531 -.0285808 .0019555
private .0167012 .0244722 .0129105
m2 n cl wchild .0134255 .0090598 .009706
m2 n teachers .0122508 .0181337 .0068231
av mathteacher absenteeism -.0098141 -.0115623 -.0082462
average MT5 teacher .0090387 .013488 .0070732
m4b material .0081017 .0074317 .0070437
m1 girls n toilets .0075114 .0119505 .0052071
average math teacher age -.007456 -.0099261 -.0071418
m4b work displayed .0069955 .0084015 .0064775
g3g4 pps -.0060582 -.0022665 -.0087438
average math teacher score .0055513 .010465 .0049273
m1 pta .0049317 .0119525 .0037899
teacher student ratio -.0048304 -.0016934 -.0066925
m1 pta meet lastyr .0044753 .0063852 .0046053
average male math teacher -.0040189 -.0089656 -.0039924
average student breakfast .003813 .0044056 .004456
m1 school type .0022964 .0038287 .0032645
m4c teach feed scold -.0021753 -.0032692 -.0030725
m4b board contrast .0019201 .0034509 .0021879
m1 sc minutes .0018939 .0107487 .0013393
m4c teach feed cor .0012676 .0064881 .0017936
m1 sc -.0011924 -.0058247 -.0021849
average mathteacher pedagogy .0007798 .0033545
share teaching .0004858 .0014477
m4c teach summary -.0003006 -.0006744
m4b electricity .000262 .002924
m4c teach creativity .0001032 .0011786
m1 streams g4 pps -.0112683
m1 streams g3 pps -.0043855
student absence -.0019049
m1 streams g3 .0015385
m1 school cat .0009996
m4 tid .0009336
av teacher edu secondary math -.0009003
m2 n classrooms .0008139
m4c teach localinfo .0006183
m4c board pup -.0005044
m1 toilets accessible -.000425
m4c teach hw -.0003663
m1 toilets clean .0003062
m4c teach intro .000056
Table 21: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Uganda sample when
predicting mathematics learning outcomes (108 potential covariates). Rounded
to 7 decimal places. 69
Uganda Language Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
g3g4 pps -.0677861 -.0864954 -.0276289
private .0498439 .0703152 .0541381
m4b material .0420311 .0480734 .0406758
average student breakfast .0396402 .0411095 .0382467
m2 n teachers .0318875 .0412359 .0335512
m1 school year -.0271451 -.054491 -.0389113
average langteacher pedagogy .0251018 .0311546 .0115724
teacher student ratio -.020768 -.015701 -.0185276
m4b work displayed .0162532 .0176643 .0180339
m4b electricity .0158926 .0172076 .016481
student absence -.0113024 -.0090868 -.0139505
m4c teach indch .0112265 .0192542 .0140513
urban .0111218 .0123633 .0141569
av teacher edu bachelors lang -.0108794 -.0206959 -.0137988
m4b chalk .0100605 .0198401 .0154582
m1 school type .008717 .0052314 .0131907
average male lang teacher -.0080082 -.0145708 -.0101536
m4c teach creativity .0070311 .0120802 .0087719
m2 n cl wchild .0058725 .0056146
m1 streams g4 pps -.005741 -.0242859
m4c teach hw corr .0048261 .0174127 .0070756
m4c teach hit -.0046529 -.010787 -.0074817
m1 sc -.0030935 -.0016094 -.0069437
m1 days in session -.0027849 -.0085204 -.0113041
av teacher edu diploma lang .0024305 .0064564 .0111182
average LT3 teacher .0019114 .0104482
m4c teach apply .0017326 .003301
m1 girls n toilets .0012355 .0073422
average LT4 teacher .000605 .01083
m4c teach hw .0003511 .006981
m4c txtbook teacher .000034 .0052126
m1 streams g3 pps -.0201131
m1 n girls g4 -.0090086
perc students usedpaperpen -.0087331
av langteacheredu gtss -.0067551
m1 sc minutes .0062021
m1 n total g4 -.0058202
m1 gender toilets -.0047991
m4 lux measure -.0043421
m1 pta meet lastyr .0037049
m4c teach intro -.0026982
m4c bookpen n pup -.0024324
m4b txtbook class .0017633
share teaching .0015946
m4d lessonplan .0014955
m4 light front .0013876
m1 toilets accessible -.0009793
m4c teach summary -.0006965
average lang teacher age -.0004268
m4c teach sitting -.0001095
Table 22: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Uganda sample when
predicting language learning outcomes (108 potential covariates). Rounded to
7 decimal places. 70
Tanzania Mathematics Post-Shrinkage Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
m2 n teachers .0184831 .0276956 .0085514
m4c teach indch n -.0164045 -.0233503 -.0016238
m1 toilets clean .0136482 .017764 .0073641
m4 lux measure -.0133737 -.0197216 -.008478
urban .0107312 .0115089 .0064782
teacher student ratio -.0093165 -.0108087 -.00893
m4c teach hw .008607 .0135372 .0058298
m1 school type .0073571 .0126614 .0057721
exbook80 .0067755 .0144379 .0049565
m4b txtbook class .0061328 .010853 .0047674
m4d pup grade rec -.0058872 -.008239 -.0047705
m4c teach intro .0050138 .0062668 .0050516
m4b board contrast .0047588 .0095732 .0053374
m4b electricity .004444 .0094758 .0051619
m4c teach summary .0036784 .005743 .0044106
av mathteacher absenteeism -.0035787 -.0070609 -.0044651
m4d n reg pup -.0033206 -.0150004 -.0025016
m4c teach task .0027216 .00874 .0024382
student absence -.0019996 -.0006932 -.0030446
m2 n classrooms .0012309 .0044249
share teaching .0012111 .0012825 .0023357
m4c teach smile .0009791 .002387
average MT5 teacher .0009557 .002228
m4c teach local lang .0006402 .002715
m4c teach feed scold -.0004271 -.0034939
m4b work displayed .0000865 .003157
m4c teach indch n -.0100695
m4b cornerlibrary .0033191
m1 toilets accessible .0030146
m4d workscheme mt -.0029096
average math teacher score .0028656
m1 toilets private .0028362
urb rur semi -.0024472
m4b material -.0024439




m2 n cl wchild .0021741
m4c teach hw corr .0021367
m4d n abs pup -.0020885
m4 light back .0020108
pencilpen80 .0020077
m2 n cl wchild noteach .0017927
m4c board pup -.0016284
average student breakfast -.0016185
m4b classroom hyg -.0015962
m1 streams g3 .0015801
perc students withtextbook .0015109
m4 light front .0013827
m1 streams g3 pps -.0013113
average mathteacher pedagogy .0012472
perc students usedpaperpen .0009088
m4c teach feedback .0009028
av teacher edu bachelors math .000735
m1 school year .0006932
m4c txtbook pup .0006765
perc students usedtextbook .0006363
m1 sc meet lastyr .0006041
av mathteacheredu gtss .0005497
av teacher edu secondary math -.0004395
perc students withexbook .0003632
m4c teach feed cor .0003088
perc students withpen .000246
private .0002308
Table 23: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Tanzania sam-
ple when predicting mathematics learning outcomes (106 potential covariates).
Rounded to 7 decimal places. 71
Tanzania Language Post-Selection Coefficients
CV Lasso Adaptive Lasso Elastic Net
m2 n teachers .0500568 .0755422 .0202803
m1 toilets clean .0283484 .0334873 .0149575
urban .0150448 .0175273 .0135767
exbook80 .0137155 .018068 .0099585
m4b electricity .0137084 .0188512 .011509
private .0135954 .0156727 .010295
average male lang teacher -.0125294 -.0155824 -.0116544
m4b board contrast .0121461 .016731 .0099128
m1 school type .0111771 .0153564 .0087896
m1 n boys g4 -.0101446 -.030817 -.0027937
m4d n abs pup -.0099769 -.0086844 -.0059143
m1 streams g4 -.0096482 -.0152636 -.0068289
m4 tid .0090312 .0059462 .0120798
m4c teach summary .0081787 .0093264 .0073789
m4b txtbook class .0076297 .0134647 .0064151
m4b chalk -.0075376 -.01286 -.0064964
m4d workscheme mt -.0068358 -.0104884 -.0059035
m4b classroom hyg -.0063148 -.0059133 -.007418
perc students withtextbook .006223 .0076393 .004257
m4d n reg pup -.0059139 -.0116197 -.0031574
m4c teach feedback .0056061 .0088883 .0053445
teacher student ratio -.0055536 -.0133656
m4c teach task .0054291 .0081686 .0050102
m1 days in session .005162 .0042072 .0067538
m4c teach indch n -.0047406 -.0085147 -.005626
m2 n cl wchild .0045996 .0057192 .0064711
m4d pup grade rec -.003809 -.002272 -.0058644
average lang teacher score .002412 .0072719
m4c teach hit .0021639 .003312
m4c teach smile .001769 .0023356
m4d offic records .0013371 .0030872
m4 light front .0010547 .0023242
m1 sc minutes .0006706 .0018233
m2 n classrooms .0004167 .0076005
m1 toilets accessible .0050027
student absence -.0046161
m1 toilets private .0039054
oprhaned classrooms .0022843
perc students usedpaperpen .0018333
urb rur semi -.0016805
average LT4 teacher -.0014759
teacher behaviour .0014534
m1 boys toilets .0013948
m4c teach hw -.0013402
av teacher edu bachelors lang -.0013185
av teacher edu diploma lang -.0011936
av langteacher absenteeism -.0010682
m1 n total g4 -.0010173
m4c teach feed cor -.0006763
m4c teach apply .0004626
perc students withpen .0004102
perc students withexbook .0003679
average LT3 teacher -.0001594
m4d lessonplan .0000869
m2 n cl wchild noteach .0000583
m4 light back .0000068
Table 24: Shows the selected and standardised post-shrinkage coefficients from
CV Lasso, Adaptive Lasso and Elastic Net methods for the Tanzania sam-
ple when predicting language learning outcomes (106 potential covariates).
Rounded to 7 decimal places. 72
A.5 Variable Selection Summaries
All Countries Variable Selection Methods Summary







CV Lasso 1,313 106 .0042345 N/A 46 0.4572 .0130678
Adaptive Lasso 1,313 106 .0020516 N/A 38 0.4879 .012328
Elastic Net 1,313 106 .2586326 0.006 81 0.4630 .0129273
Panel B: Language
CV Lasso 1,208 106 .0040341 N/A 50 0.5883 .0320406
Adaptive Lasso 1,208 106 .0039107 N/A 42 0.6062 .0306479
Elastic Net 1,208 106 .0213314 0.186 71 0.5884 .0320284
Table 25: Shows the regularisation methods used to estimate the best predictors
of learning outcomes. For full lists of the initial (p) and selected covariates p
please refer to the appendix. Also N = 2, 069 before the analysis, but missing
observations for some covariates led to exclusion which reduced the samples
(N). Note that for the Elastic Net models, the alpha selection was limited to
0.001 increments between 0 and 1.
Kenya Variable Selection Methods Summary







CV Lasso 189 108 .0038026 N/A 37 0.3476 .0058093
Adaptive Lasso 189 108 .0119422 N/A 30 0.4705 .004715
Elastic Net 189 108 .29442 0.01 89 0.3580 .0057168
Panel B: Language
CV Lasso 194 108 .0083454 N/A 32 0.3282 .0173272
Adaptive Lasso 194 108 .0008605 N/A 31 0.4304 .0146913
Elastic Net 194 108 .0502605 0.158 33 0.3311 .0172534
Table 26: Shows the regularisation methods used to estimate the best predictors
of learning outcomes in Kenya. For full lists of the initial (p) and selected
covariates p please refer to the appendix. Also N = 306 before the analysis,
but missing observations for some covariates led to exclusion which reduced the
samples (N). Note that for the Elastic Net models, the alpha selection was
limited to 0.001 increments between 0 and 1.
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Mozambique Variable Selection Methods Summary







CV Lasso 103 106 .008222 N/A 11 0.1090 .0040209
Adaptive Lasso 103 106 .0006958 N/A 10 0.2753 .0032702
Elastic Net 103 106 .1086902 0.075 11 0.1142 .0039971
Panel B: Language
CV Lasso 103 106 .0313867 N/A 8 0.2188 .0352774
Adaptive Lasso 103 106 .0457933 N/A 5 0.3237 .030539
Elastic Net 103 106 .0313867 0.972 8 0.2188 .0352739
Table 27: Shows the regularisation methods used to estimate the best predictors
of learning outcomes in Mozambique. For full lists of the initial (p) and selected
covariates p please refer to the appendix. Also N = 203 before the analysis,
but missing observations for some covariates led to exclusion which reduced the
samples (N). Note that for the Elastic Net models, the alpha selection was
limited to 0.001 increments between 0 and 1.
Nigeria Variable Selection Methods Summary







CV Lasso 513 108 .0042132 N/A 47 0.3795 .0157335
Adaptive Lasso 513 108 .0216007 N/A 31 0.4242 .0146
Elastic Net 447 108 .3401735 0.006 73 0.389 .015493
Panel B: Language
CV Lasso 433 108 .0106069 N/A 32 0.5437 .0363554
Adaptive Lasso 433 108 .0055054 N/A 27 0.5747 .0338807
Elastic Net 433 108 .102592 0.087 45 0.5455 .0362108
Table 28: Shows the regularisation methods used to estimate the best predictors
of learning outcomes in Nigeria. For full lists of the initial (p) and selected
covariates p please refer to the appendix. Also N = 760 before the analysis,
but missing observations for some covariates led to exclusion which reduced the
samples (N). Note that for the Elastic Net models, the alpha selection was
limited to 0.001 increments between 0 and 1.
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Uganda Variable Selection Methods Summary







CV Lasso 258 108 .0063541 N/A 28 0.4543 .0064803
Adaptive Lasso 258 108 .00251 N/A 23 0.5265 .0056225
Elastic Net 258 108 .3721617 0.014 42 0.4602 .0064092
Panel B: Language
CV Lasso 242 108 .0119606 N/A 31 0.6176 .0264819
Adaptive Lasso 242 108 .0285689 N/A 23 0.6746 .0225338
Elastic Net 242 108 .0549599 0.115 50 0.6183 .0264331
Table 29: Shows the regularisation methods used to estimate the best predictors
of learning outcomes in Uganda. For full lists of the initial (p) and selected
covariates p please refer to the appendix. Also N = 400 before the analysis,
but missing observations for some covariates led to exclusion which reduced the
samples (N). Note that for the Elastic Net models, the alpha selection was
limited to 0.001 increments between 0 and 1.
Tanzania Variable Selection Methods Summary







CV Lasso 230 106 .0080407 N/A 26 0.1825 .0114339
Adaptive Lasso 230 106 .0079694 N/A 20 0.3114 .0096303
Elastic Net 230 106 1.129236 0.002 65 0.2066 .0110967
Panel B: Language
CV Lasso 220 106 .0081024 N/A 34 0.3007 .021913
Adaptive Lasso 220 106 .006991 N/A 26 0.3965 .0189106
Elastic Net 220 106 .6273374 0.008 56 0.3166 .0214167
Table 30: Shows the regularisation methods used to estimate the best predictors
of learning outcomes in Tanzania. For full lists of the initial (p) and selected
covariates p please refer to the appendix. Also N = 400 before the analysis,
but missing observations for some covariates led to exclusion which reduced the
samples (N). Note that for the Elastic Net models, the alpha selection was
limited to 0.001 increments between 0 and 1.
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A.6 OLS Descriptive Statistics
All Countries Descriptive Statistics - Mathematics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Mathematics Score .4462 .1637 0 1 2068
Teacher Subject Knowledge .5374 .2392 0 1 1994
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .2233 .1565 0 .8376 1994
Teacher Education .4954 .4551 0 1 1995
Teacher Absenteeism .2611 .3436 0 1 1995
Teacher Behaviour 8.755 2.81 1 14 1831
Student-Teacher Ratio 154.1 164.5 0 1492 2065
Share of Time Spent Teaching .8749 .2302 0 1 2067
Facilities Index 7.573 2.153 0 13 2048
School Committee .8811 .3237 0 1 2069
Students Per Stream 49.98 39.71 0 331 2045
Private .2187 .4134 0 1 2067
Urban .2146 .4106 0 1 2069
Student Breakfast .7055 .3154 0 1 2068
Student Absenteeism .246 .2396 0 1 2005
Table 31: Shows the descriptive statistics for mathematics in ’All Countries’.
Note that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first
4 digits where appropriate.
All Countries Descriptive Statistics - Language
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Language Score .503 .2916 .0012 1 2068
Teacher Subject Knowledge .4366 .1773 0 .8444 1879
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .2314 .1607 0 .7051 1879
Teacher Education .4623 .4615 0 1 1879
Teacher Absenteeism .2457 .3655 0 1 1879
Teacher Behaviour 8.755 2.81 1 14 1831
Student-Teacher Ratio 154.1 164.5 0 1492 2065
Share of Time Spent Teaching .8749 .2302 0 1 2067
Facilities Index 7.573 2.153 0 13 2048
School Committee .8811 .3237 0 1 2069
Students Per Stream 49.98 39.71 0 331 2045
Private .2187 .4134 0 1 2067
Urban .2146 .4106 0 1 2069
Student Breakfast .7055 .3154 0 1 2068
Student Absenteeism .246 .2396 0 1 2005
Table 32: Shows the descriptive statistics for language in ’All Countries’. Note
that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
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Kenya Descriptive Statistics - Mathematics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Math Score .6057 .0971 .3471 .9294 306
Teacher Subject Knowledge .7998 .1333 .2717 1 297
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .3638 .1459 0 .7479 297
Teacher Education .6782 .3489 0 1 297
Teacher Absenteeism .3431 .3719 0 1 297
Teacher Behaviour 10.32 2.631 1 14 229
Student-Teacher Ratio 91.11 108.1 7.364 654 306
Share of Time Spent Teaching .7959 .2959 0 1 306
Facilities Index 8.661 1.386 5 12 304
Parent-Teacher Association .4020 .4911 0 1 306
School Committee .9379 .2417 0 1 306
Students Per Stream 37.53 17.22 2 95 304
Private .2190 .4142 0 1 306
Urban .3235 .4686 0 1 306
Student Breakfast .8717 .1698 .1 1 306
Student Absenteeism .1203 .1488 0 1 278
Table 33: Shows the descriptive statistics for mathematics in Kenya. Note that
the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
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Kenya Descriptive Statistics - Language
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Language Score .8003 .1621 .0432 1 306
Teacher Subject Knowledge .6495 .0952 .3333 .8444 296
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .3602 .1461 0 .6906 296
Teacher Education .7007 .3527 0 1 296
Teacher Absenteeism .3275 .3698 0 1 296
Teacher Behaviour 10.32 2.631 1 14 229
Student-Teacher Ratio 91.11 108.1 7.364 654 306
Share of Time Spent Teaching .7959 .2959 0 1 306
Facilities Index 8.661 1.386 5 12 304
Parent-Teacher Association .4020 .4911 0 1 306
School Committee .9379 .2417 0 1 306
Students Per Stream 37.53 17.22 2 95 304
Private .2190 .4142 0 1 306
Urban .3235 .4686 0 1 306
Student Breakfast .8717 .1698 .1 1 306
Student Absenteeism .1203 .1488 0 1 278
Table 34: Shows the descriptive statistics for language in Kenya. Note that the
numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits where
appropriate.
Mozambique Descriptive Statistics - Mathematics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Mathematics Score .2542 .0745 .0588 .7059 203
Teacher Subject Knowledge .2599 .1664 0 .8696 182
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .1263 .1237 0 .6105 182
Teacher Education .0663 .1942 0 1 182
Teacher Absenteeism .3196 .4257 0 1 182
Teacher Behaviour 6.819 2.247 1 13 199
Student-Teacher Ratio 247 176.9 25 862 200
Share of Time Spent Teaching .9617 .0779 .2683 1 203
Facilities Index 6.837 1.823 2 10 203
School Committee .7734 .4197 0 1 203
Students Per Stream 46.18 17.77 6 98.5 203
Urban .1527 .3606 0 1 203
Student Breakfast .7308 .2684 0 1 203
Student Absenteeism .51 .2718 0 .9815 202
Table 35: Shows the descriptive statistics for mathematics in Mozambique. Note
that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
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Mozambique Descriptive Statistics - Language
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Language Score .2103 .1989 .013 .9351 203
Teacher Subject Knowledge .2935 .1054 0 .6341 182
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .1263 .1214 0 .6105 182
Teacher Education .0681 .1956 0 1 182
Teacher Absenteeism .3288 .4313 0 1 182
Teacher Behaviour 6.819 2.247 1 13 199
Student-Teacher Ratio 247 176.9 25 862 200
Share of Time Spent Teaching .9617 .0779 .2683 1 203
Facilities Index 6.837 1.823 2 10 203
School Committee .7734 .4197 0 1 203
Students Per Stream 46.18 17.77 6 98.5 203
Urban .1527 .3606 0 1 203
Student Breakfast .7308 .2684 0 1 203
Student Absenteeism .51 .2718 0 .9815 202
Table 36: Shows the descriptive statistics for language in Mozambique. Note
that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
Nigeria Descriptive Statistics - Mathematics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Mathematics Score .4046 .1727 0 1 760
Teacher Subject Knowledge .4299 .2097 0 .9565 759
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .1316 .1073 0 .4866 759
Teacher Education .9338 .1449 0 1 760
Teacher Absenteeism .1520 .2242 0 1 760
Teacher Behaviour 8.889 3.061 1 14 682
Student-Teacher Ratio 141.8 136.9 0 1492 760
Share of Time Spent Teaching .8607 .2547 0 .9833 760
Facilities Index 6.814 2.69 0 13 760
Parent-Teacher Association .9592 .1979 0 1 760
School Committee .7776 .4161 0 1 760
Students Per Stream 26.67 17.63 0 157 738
Private .3958 .4893 0 1 758
Urban .2053 .4042 0 1 760
Student Breakfast .8799 .1898 0 1 760
Student Absenteeism .2054 .2433 0 1 743
Table 37: Shows the descriptive statistics for mathematics in Nigeria. Note
that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4
digits where appropriate.
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Nigeria Descriptive Statistics - Language
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Language Score .4534 .306 .0012 1 760
Teacher Subject Knowledge .3322 .14 0 .6444 662
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .13 .1124 0 .6487 662
Teacher Education .8446 .3325 0 1 662
Teacher Absenteeism .1002 .2695 0 1 662
Teacher Behaviour 8.889 3.061 1 14 682
Student-Teacher Ratio 141.8 136.9 0 1492 760
Share of Time Spent Teaching .8607 .2547 0 .9833 760
Facilities Index 6.814 2.69 0 13 760
Parent-Teacher Association .9592 .1979 0 1 760
School Committee .7776 .4161 0 1 760
Students Per Stream 26.67 17.63 0 157 738
Private .3958 .4893 0 1 758
Urban .2053 .4042 0 1 760
Student Breakfast .8799 .1898 0 1 760
Student Absenteeism .2054 .2433 0 1 743
Table 38: Shows the descriptive statistics for language in Nigeria. Note that the
numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits where
appropriate.
Uganda Descriptive Statistics - Mathematics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Mathematics Score .4568 .1133 .2118 .7765 399
Teacher Subject Knowledge .6014 .1729 0 .913 379
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .2126 .1122 0 .5684 379
Teacher Education .0648 .2035 0 1 379
Teacher Absenteeism .3405 .3944 0 1 379
Teacher Behaviour 9.465 2.06 3 14 342
Student-Teacher Ratio 165.2 198 6.636 1154 399
Share of Time Spent Teaching .8992 .1918 0 1 398
Facilities Index 8.49 1.428 5 13 390
Parent-Teacher Association .89 .313 0 1 400
School Committee .975 .1563 0 1 400
Students Per Stream 79.71 44.21 5 295 400
Private .2025 .4024 0 1 400
Urban .1875 .3908 0 1 400
Student Breakfast .6221 .2596 0 1 399
Student Absenteeism .2321 .1687 0 1 395
Table 39: Shows the descriptive statistics for mathematics in Uganda. Note
that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4
digits where appropriate.
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Uganda Descriptive Statistics - Language
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Language Score .5255 .2697 .0432 .9988 399
Teacher Subject Knowledge .5631 .1197 .1333 .8222 376
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .2264 .1138 0 .6177 376
Teacher Education .0815 .239 0 1 376
Teacher Absenteeism .3568 .3908 0 1 376
Teacher Behaviour 9.465 2.06 3 14 342
Student-Teacher Ratio 165.2 198 6.636 1154 399
Share of Time Spent Teaching .8992 .1918 0 1 398
Facilities Index 8.49 1.428 5 13 390
Parent-Teacher Association .89 .313 0 1 400
School Committee .975 .1563 0 1 400
Students Per Stream 79.71 44.21 5 295 400
Private .2025 .4024 0 1 400
Urban .1875 .3908 0 1 400
Student Breakfast .6221 .2596 0 1 399
Student Absenteeism .2321 .1687 0 1 395
Table 40: Shows the descriptive statistics for language in Uganda. Note that
the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
Tanzania Descriptive Statistics - Mathematics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Mathematics Score .4902 .125 .1 .8294 400
Teacher Subject Knowledge .6165 .1787 0 1 377
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .3549 .123 0 .8376 377
Teacher Education .1079 .2432 0 1 377
Teacher Absenteeism .3085 .364 0 1 377
Teacher Behaviour 7.945 2.469 1 13 379
Student-Teacher Ratio 168.2 180.5 17.19 836 400
Share of Time Spent Teaching .894 .1859 0 1 400
Facilities Index 7.67 1.352 4 11 391
School Committee .995 .0706 0 1 400
Students Per Stream 74.65 50.39 12 331 400
Private .01 .0996234 0 1 400
Urban .2075 .406 0 1 400
Student Breakfast .3113 .2842 0 1 382
Student Absenteeism .2906 .2181 0 1 387
Table 41: Shows the descriptive statistics for mathematics in Tanzania. Note
that the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
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Tanzania Descriptive Statistics - Language
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Average Student Language Score .4959 .1814 .0432 .9309 400
Teacher Subject Knowledge .394 .1177 .0667 .8222 363
Teacher Pedagogical Skills .3692 .1253 0 7051 363
Teacher Education .1629 .3018 0 1 363
Teacher Absenteeism .2874 .3683 0 1 363
Teacher Behaviour 7.945 2.469 1 13 379
Student-Teacher Ratio 168.2 180.5 17.19 836 400
Share of Time Spent Teaching .894 .1859 0 1 400
Facilities Index 7.67 1.352 4 11 391
School Committee .995 .0706 0 1 400
Students Per Stream 74.65 50.39 12 331 400
Private .01 .0996234 0 1 400
Urban .2075 .406 0 1 400
Student Breakfast .3113 .2842 0 1 382
Student Absenteeism .2906 .2181 0 1 387
Table 42: Shows the descriptive statistics for language in Tanzania. Note that
the numbers reported were rounded to 4 decimal points, or the first 4 digits
where appropriate.
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A.7 Highest and Lowest VIF Scores
The highest VIF for ’All Countries’ Mathematics was the covariate for the per-
centage of teachers with an education greater than secondary school with 1.68
and the lowest was the mathematics teacher’s absence rate covariate with 1.12.
The highest VIF for ’All Countries’ Language was the covariate for student
breakfast with 1.59 and the lowest was the language teacher’s absence rate
covariate with 1.09.
The highest VIF for Kenya Mathematics was the Private covariate with 1.88
and the lowest was the Student Absence covariate with 1.06.
The highest VIF for Kenya Language was the Private covariate with 1.76
and the lowest was the Student Absence covariate with 1.07.
The highest for Mozambique Mathematics was the Student Absence covari-
ate with 1.48 and the lowest was the Share of Time Spent Teaching covariate
with 1.04. The highest VIF for Mozambique Language was student absence
with 1.50 and the lowest was the Share of Time Spent Teaching covariate with
1.4.
The highest VIF for Nigeria Mathematics was the Share of Time Spent
Teaching covariate with 1.55 and the lowest was the Average Student Breakfast
covariate with 1.08. The highest VIF for Nigeria Language was the Share of
Time Spent Teaching covariate with 1.58 and the lowest was the PTA dummy
covariate with 1.07.
The highest VIF for Uganda Mathematics was the Private dummy covariate
with 1.58 and the lowest was the Average Student Breakfast covariate with 1.09.
The highest VIF for Uganda Language was the Private dummy covariate with
1.55 and the lowest was the Teacher Behaviour covariate with 1.08.
The highest VIF for Tanzania Mathematics was the Urban dummy covariate
with 1.34 and the lowest was the SC dummy covariate with 1.02. The highest
VIF for Tanzania Language was urban dummy covariate with 1.42 and the
lowest was the SC dummy covariate with 1.02.
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